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The flood hazard in established urban areas is increasing. This is due to the effects of 
anthropogenic modification of catchments and rivers, and an increase in climatic 
extremes caused by global climate change, which result in an increase of the occurrence 
and magnitude of flooding, and the establishment of the 'catastrophe potential' cycle, 
which creates an increasingly vulnerable society. 
The main research problem of this study is the adequacy of processes provided by the 
natural hazards legislation with which local authorities can respond to increased flooding 
risks in established urban areas. Specific objectives are: to explore potential conflicts 
between existing use rights under the Resource Management Act and planning for an 
increasing flood risk; to assess the natural hazards management framework in relation to 
responding to an increasing natural hazard; and to develop recommendations by which 
local government authorities can respond to increased flood hazards. 
The approach to the problem involves a discussion of flood hazard management 
techniques, a review of the natural hazards management legislation in New Zealand, and 
a case study of local government response to the increased flood risk in Alexandra, 
Central Otago. 
This research reveals a number of significant issues concerning the hazard management 
process in Alexandra, and implications for other situations. These are the effectiveness of 
relevant legislation, liability issues, the relationship between different levels of local 
government, perception of the flood hazard, the physical response to flooding in 
Alexandra, and the difficulties of responding proactively to increased flood hazards. 
From this, many impediments to a proactive response by a local authority to an increased 
flood hazard have been identified. These include problems with the perception of the 






Recommendations include the provision of national direction in addressing this issue, 
amendment of the legislation to allow greater powers of response to local authorities, the 
provision of funding, and the formation of legislation concerning the effects of large 
dams. There is also a need for a formal mechanism to require joint hazard plans between 
regional and district councils to prevent the formation of a gap in natural hazards 
management, and a tightening of hazard avoidance legislation. Requirements for the 
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1.1 Natural Hazard Management 
Flooding affects more people each year worldwide than any other natural disaster (Ward, 
1978), and is New Zealand's number one hazard (McKerchar & Pearson, 2001). It is the 
largest source of insurance damage claims from natural hazards (McKerchar & Pearson, 
2001), and is estimated to have cost New Zealand $90 million per year since 1968 
(Bergham & Westlake, 2001). Nearly 100 communities, containing over two-thirds of the 
total population, are flood-prone (Ericksen, 1986, Bergham & Westlake, 2001). From 
this, a 200 year return flood can be expected in one community every other year 
(Ericksen, 1986) . 
The risk of flooding in established urban areas is increasing, both in New Zealand and 
internationally, due to changing natural climatic patterns, and anthropogenic modification 
of catchments. Nothing in nature is static, and all natural processes change and vary 
dynamically. Rivers meander across the landscape, periodically exceeding their banks and 
forming floodplains. Sea level fluctuates, and climate is a chaotic system. Where these 
natural processes impinge on human activities the potential for a hazard exists. 
Anthropogenic modification of both land and water bodies increase this potential. 
Controlling, damming or restricting the flow of rivers leads to aggregation and siltation 
of riverbeds, with an increased risk of bank exceedence. Protecting land from the effects 
of flooding encourages development on that land, which in turn creates the need for 














The management of natural hazards within New Zealand is primarily undertaken via the 
provisions of the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) (Phizacklea, 2001). This statute 
establishes a framework of plans and policy statements at national, regional and district 
levels, all of which must not be inconsistent with those at a higher level, and with the 
purpose and principles of the RMA (Part II). This framework controls the actions of 
local governmental organisations in response to natural hazards, along with the Building 
Act 1991, the Civil Defence Act 1983, and the Local Government Act 1974 . 
The RMA sets forth a process by which new development at risk from natural hazards 
may be restricted or controlled by local government. This involves control over 
subdivision (Sections 106, 108 and 220 of the RMA, and district plan land use and 
subdivision rules), and building consents (Section 36 Building Act), as well as 
development impact fees, esplanade reserve creation, and covenants. 
Although this provides a process for preventing hazard prone development, in areas 
where development has already occurred, pro-active restrictions and hazard avoidance is 
clearly not possible. Established buildings and structures are protected from council 
modification by the existing use rights conferred by Section 10 of the RMA. Under this 
statute, rebuilding an existing, lawfully established structure that is at risk from natural 
hazards is allowed even when the current district plan rules prohibit it, provided the 
structure is the same or similar in character, intensity and scale as that which presently 
stands (Phizacklea, 2001). 
In situations where this occurs, local councils are caught in a dilemma. One choice is the 
"do nothing" approach, refusing to protect at risk developments, and counting on 
individual choice and market forces generated by perception of the hazard to reduce the 
risk. The alternative is to take proactive steps to reduce the risk to the development. 
However, there are several constraints on this second option, including the difficulty of 
defining an increased natural hazard with enough precision to justify a response before a 
disaster occurs, and the social inertia to change. This can also be perceived as councils 
imposing the costs generated by those at risk on the entire community; in effect 












In either situation, potential liability exists for the affected council. The responsibility for 
community protection falls on Territorial Local Authorities that must balance these 
issues, often with limited resources, and limited community understanding of the nature 
of the hazard. 
1.2 Study Purpose 
1.2.1 Research Problem 
The main research problem addressed in this study is the adequacy of processes provided 
by the natural hazards legislation with which local authorities can respond to increased 
flooding risks in established urban areas. 
1.2.2 Objectives 
The principal research objectives of this study are: 
1. To explore potential conflicts between existing use rights (Section 10) under 
the Resource Management Act 1991, and planning for increasing frequency 
and magnitude of flood hazards. 
11. To assess the current natural hazards management framework in relation to 
responding to an increasing natural hazard. 
111. To develop recommendations by which local government authorities can 
respond to increased flood hazards . 
These will be accomplished by conducting a case study of the local government response 
to the increased flood hazard confronting the community of Alexandra, Central Otago; a 
community struck by three major floods within a period of five years during the 1990s. 











o Institutional roles and responsibilities 
o The response to the increased flood hazard 
o Perception of the hazard 
o Liability issues 
o The ability of local government to plan proactively for increasing natural hazards 
1.3 General Methodology 
1.3.1 Theoretical Framework 
This report is based on the natural hazards management theoretical regime, a subset of 
the larger field of environmental management. It operates within an interdisciplinary 
framework, combining the fields of engineering, science and social science to manage the 
conflict between society and extreme natural events. 
1.3.2 Secondary Research 
Literature and archival records are investigated to provide an overview of natural hazards 
research theory, and the New Zealand historical and current hazard management 
legislation. This is used to develop a theoretical framework with which to analyse the case 
study findings. 
1.3.3 Primary Research 
A case study investigation of the Alexandra response to an increased flood risk was 
conducted through semi-structured interviews with key participants in the response 
process. These participants were either heavily involved in the formulation processes of 


















Several terms relating to the study of natural hazards, and the probabilistic basis of 
prediction are used in this report, and require definition. 
The Annual Exceedence Probability (A.E.P.) is the flood peak level that has a 1 % 
probability of being exceeded or equalled in any given year . 
r" 
The inverse of the A.E.P. gives the return period of the flood; a 1 % A.E.P. flood has a 
return period of 100 years, while a 2% A.E.P. flood has a return period of 50 years. This 
is commonly, but incorrectly, termed the 100 year flood, or 50 year flood, which removes 
the probabilistic component from the description. 
Cumecs are the standard unit of measurement for river flow. The term stands for cubic 
metres per second (m3s-1). 
RL, when prefixing a unit of measurement, denotes the height above relative (sea) level 
of the point of measurement. 




!Figure 1: Report Structure.I 
This report is composed of eight chapters, 
which together address the main research 
question and objectives through a process 
that applies the theoretical framework of 
natural hazards management to a specific 
case study, and extrapolates the findings 













This Chapter has provided a background to the topic of study and outlined the 
importance of the research problem. The objectives have been defined, and a general 
methodology is presented. 
Chapter Two reviews the current concepts of flood hazard management, including. 
flooding as a natural hazard, flood hazard management techniques, and the potential for 
conflict between existing development and increasing flood risk. 
The Third Chapter investigates the development of flood hazard management in New 
Zealand, and reviews the ability of local government to respond to increasing flood 
hazards under the current legislative regime of the Resource Management Act 1991 and 
the Building Act 1991. 
The research strategy under which this report was prepared is outlined and justified in 
Chapter Four. Data acquisition and analysis techniques conducted within the framework 
of qualitative research are summarized and justified. 
Chapter Five presents the Alexandra case study, where a series of major floods during 
the 1990s prompted Local Government action. The historical and increased flood 
hazards are described, as are the effects of the recent flooding and the Local 
Government response. 
Chapter Six identifies and analyses the issues identified from the case study as important 
in addressing the research objectives. 
A conclusion is presented in Chapter Seven, where the previous chapters are synthesised, 
and the research objectives are addressed. 
Chapter Eight provides recommendations concerning natural hazard management in 














"the flood remains a bare!J mitigated evil a hard!J appreciated obstacle to progress. 
Indeed, as population has increased, men have not on!J failed to achieve means for 
suppressing it, or for escaping this evil but have, with singular short-sightedness rushed 
into its chosen paths" 
WJ. McGee, (1891). 
This Chapter shows that although floods are natural phenomena, natural hazards only 
exist where these phenomena interact negatively with human systems. It describes and 
assesses the techniques by which society responds to these hazards, and shows the 
evolution of changing flood management paradigms. 
2.1 Flooding as a Natural Hazard 
A flood is a naturally occurring phenomenon that is an integral feature of the dynamic 
nature of river systems. Although a common physical event, there are a multitude of 
definitions within the literature. A flood can be defined as; 
"the flow ef a larger than average volume ef water along a river channel" (W'"ohl 2000) 
This very general definition is too simple to be of use in this study, as it fails to 
distinguish between standard variations in river flow and potentially catastrophic events. 
At the other end of this spectrum is; 
A flood is a botjy ef water which rises to oveiflow land which is not normal!} submerged 











The implication of damage in the last three words of this definition (Smith & Ward, 
1998) causes this definition to ignore those cases where floods do not affect human 
activities; it fails to distinguish between the extreme physical event, and the creation of a 
natural hazard. 
A definition of flooding that moderates between these two extremes is; 
"an extreme!J high river leve4 whereqy water inundates land outside the water-cotifined river channels" 
(Yetjevich, 1992) 
This highlights several important factors in flooding. These are the uncommon 
occurrence of the event (extreme!J high), and water being no longer confined within river 
banks, without necessarily implying any damage or impact on society. 
Flooding as a natural process has many effects beneficial to society. These include the 
deposition of sediments to form flat land and arable soils, replenishment of soil minerals 
and nutrients, removal of accumulated chemicals within the soils, maintenance of 
biological diversity within the floodplain, and supply of water to lalces, wetlands and soil 
moisture (Smith & Ward, 1998, Yevjevich, 1995). It is only when these naturally 
occurring phenomena interact negatively with social processes that a natural hazard is 
created. Where floodwaters have the potential to cause damage and loss to human 
activities, a hazard exists. Thus, while floods are natural events, a flood hazard is a human 
construct (Ward, 1978). This interaction of human activity and natural events, resulting in 
the creation of both resources and hazards, is shown in Figure 2. 
The adverse effects of flooding as a natural hazard can be divided into three categories 
(Moser, 1992); 
>- direct economic effects (property damage, income losses and clean-up costs), 
>- indirect economic effects (reduction in spending, loss or interruption of production), 
>- intangible effects (those effects difficult to assign a monetary value to, such as loss of 

























Figure 2; The interaction of human activity and natural events. Modified from Burton & al, 
1993. 
White (1973) defines a natural hazard as an interaction of people and nature governed by 
the co-e,xistent state of adjustment of the human system, and the state of nature in the 
natural system. Alexander (1993) emphasises that both the natural and human 
dimensions ofa natural hazard are dynamic and adjustable. As Figure 3 shows, the 
chosen adjustment may seek to change aspects of the natural flood event such as 
drainage, flow path or river capacity, or modify human use, through changes in 































These adjustments to a natural hazard are a result of; 
i) The awareness or perception of the risk; 
ii) Commercial considerations; 
iii) The restraints acting on local government (Coch, 1995). 
A demand for protection arises when a risk is perceived, but the protection provided will 
be limited by willingness, and ability, to pay for it (Bell, 1999). 
This interaction can work in both positive and negative ways. In many situations human 
activities are accelerating or altering a normally benign process in such a way as to raise 
the likelihood of the hazard occurring, or increasing the potential damage caused. These 
situations, where human activities both affect, and are in turn affected by the modified 
natural process, are termed 'human geohazards' (Coch, 1995). In the three types of 
flooding identified by Yevjevich (1992), modified natural floods, which include flood 
events affected by humans, are seen as a major, and increasing, phenomenon. Such 
activities include catchment modification ( deforestation, stock grazing, burning), 
urbanisation of upstream areas (increasing run-off) and river control works (changing 
patterns of erosion and sedimentation). 
Recognition of the negative influence that human modification of the environment is 
having on natural hazard occurrence and effects has led to a paradigm shift amongst 
hazard management researchers and practitioners. The concept of sustainable 
development, and adjusting human behaviour rather than natural event systems, is now 
being increasingly incorporated into hazard management and planning systems. 
Another factor of great importance to flood hazard management is the influence of 
global climate change on precipitation patterns. A major concern from this is an increase 
in the occurrence of extreme events, such as flooding (Easterling & al., 2000). Studies of 
the causes of increased flood damage in recent years have identified climatic change and 


















2.2 Flood Hazard Management Techniques 
Societies have contended with floods since the dawn of civilisation (Laituri, 2000). This is 
due to the dependence of societies on the resources provided by floodplains and rivers; 
flat land, rich alluvial soils, and a convenient water supply. 
Historically, the methods used to avoid the adverse consequences, while gaining the 
beneficial effects of flooding, have been a direct function of the level of technology of a 
civilisation (Yevjevich, 1992). Whereas less developed cultures have traditionally accepted 
floods as natural events, and either avoided hazardous areas or accepted the risk, 
technologically based cultures have sought to use these areas without risk, by dominating 
nature and removing the hazard. It is only relatively recently that there has been a trend 
away from reliance on this technocratic solution towards an approach that seeks to 
combine modification of both natural and human behaviour, within a socio-economic 
approach that accepts that complete protection from flooding is impossible and that 
some risk must be accepted (Smith & Ward, 1998, p33). 
While several classification approaches to flood management techniques exist ( e.g. 
Yevjevich, 1992), the dominant typology classifies adjustment responses in one of the 
following three ways (White, 1973, Mitchell & al., 1978, Ericksen, 1986, Bewick, 1988, 
Thomas, 1995a, Smith & Ward, 1998): 
• Modify flooding 
• 
Reduce the magnitude and frequency of the flooding process by modifying or 
controlling the physical system. 
Modify vulnerability. 
Reduce the damage potential and costs of hazard zone occupation by adjusting or 
controlling the human use of land. 
• Modify flood losses 
Mitigate or share losses from a flood event with insurance, relief and Central 
Government financial assistance. 




















These techniques are described in greater detail below. 
2.2.1 Modify Flooding 
This approach to flood management seeks to modify the behaviour of floodwaters by the 
use of engineering based structural mechanisms. These can include flood diversion 
channels, the establishment of levees, stop banks and water retention dams, and the 
channelisation and straightening of rivers. This is an anthropogenically centred approach 
which assumes that the achievements of technology are sufficient to remove risk from 
extreme natural events (Alexander, 1993). 
The principles of river regulation and training were developed in Europe in the 15th-16th 
Centuries, but it was during the 19th Century that major efforts to regulate the entire 
course of major European rivers, with the aim of reducing flood-prone areas, were 
initiated (Rossi, 1992). Despite expectations, these methods did not always prevent flood 
damage. While preventing damage from frequent, smaller floods, levees were not 
designed for the very rare major floods that caused the most damage. Aggradation of the 
river bed raised the river level, increasing the frequency of flooding, while the apparent 
security provided by these measures encouraged intensification of development on the 
floodplain (Rossi, 1992). This last feature is the most important aspect of flood 
modification, as the increased economic potential and value of flood-prone land has 
resulted in an increased flood risk should the initial defences fail. Consequently, these 
defences are upgraded, resulting in a spiralling cycle of increasing costs, and increased 
risk and potential damage. This self-perpetuating problem is termed the 'levee effect' 
(Smith & Ward, 1998), or the 'catastrophe potential' (Ericksen, 1986). 
The benefits of the structural approach are considerable; the protection of valuable land 
use activities (such as urban areas) and the enhancement of the economic potential of 
flood-prone land under normal river flow conditions (Ericksen, 1986). However, there 
are significant costs associated with structural flood protection works. These include the 
expense of initial implementation, ongoing maintenance costs, and the creation of a false 
sense of security that can lead to the 'levee effect'. Another disadvantage of this approach 
is the potential negative impact on natural values and character of riverine systems. These 























unforeseen (such as the impact of the Woolston Cut, Heathcote River, Christchurch, 
New Zealand (Christchurch Drainage Board, 1978)). Also, it is often difficult to justify 
and reconcile the appropriateness of structural works with the philosophy of the 
sustainable management framework (Chapman, 1995). 
Despite recognition of these problems, the structural approach continued in the United 
States of America from the late 18th Century through to the 1960s (Thomas, 1995b) with 
the Mississippi River providing a prime example of the 'catastrophe potential' spiral 
(Merritts, 2000). Despite thousands of kilometres oflevees, hundreds of water control 
dams and reservoirs, and over 300 kilometres of river meander removed, flooding in 
1993 inundated over 75 towns, killed 48 people, caused the evacuation of 54,000 more, 
and affected over 30 million ha of land. Total damage has been estimated at between $12 
and $15 billion US (Merritts, 2000) . 
Significantly, non-structural methods of minimising flood damage are now being 
implemented on the Mississippi (Gruntfest, 2000, Changnon, 1998). In 1994 a federal 
interagency floodplain management review committee proposed that a strategy of 
avoiding inappropriate floodplain use, minimizing vulnerability to damage through 
structural and non-structural means, and mitigating damage as it occurs be adopted. This 
report did not call for the abandonment of human use of the floodplain, but required full 
consideration of the economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of future 
floodplain activity (Galloway, 1995). 
2.2.2 Modify vulnerability 
This approach seeks to reduce the losses caused by floods by avoiding the dangerous, 
uneconomic, and unsuitable uses of hazard-prone areas (Thomas, 1995a). This is 
accomplished by modifying human behaviour to reduce the exposure to flood hazards 
and the potential damage a flood would cause. It has been described as the most 
important recent development in coping with floods, as it seeks to optimise the 
relationship between human floodplain use and flooding (Yevjevich, 1995) by accepting 




























This paradigm recognises that, aside from structural flood control works to protect 
existing development, the continuing growth of flood losses can only be contained by 
ensuring new development addresses both the risk of, and susceptibility to, flooding, and 
responds appropriately. This is accomplished by avoiding development within high-risk 
areas through land use planning and management, and reducing the vulnerability of 










Acquisition and relocation 
By these means, developments clearly situated at risk from flooding can be modified so 
as to avoid establishing the catastrophe potential cycle. 
The modified vulnerability approach is far more difficult to implement than the structural 
approach described above. Land use control requires the support of local populations 
(Bell, 1999) that are rarely pleased with restrictions on private property rights. There are 
many reasons why this approach may not work. Members of a community, including 
decision makers, may not understand the 'seductive' nature of the flood hazard (Pielke, 
1999), and will see no reason to implement these methods. Others are comfortable with 
a higher risk, and will perceive controls as a restriction of their private rights. Also, the 
abandonment of flood prone land, or the prevention of development may be viewed as 
depriving the community of a valuable natural resource that could be used to produce 
income now, against the chance of an uncertain future event (Burton, 1965). 
2.2.3 Modify flood losses 
Insurance, by spreading the cost of flooding over all policy holders, imposes the losses of 
those using hazard-prone resources on those who do not. In effect, these other users 
subsidise the occupation of flood-prone areas. This has been recognised by insurance 
companies that refuse to insure, or charge high premiums in, areas that have recently 




























Flood insurance can be used by public administration to achieve specific objectives of 
land-use safety and appropriate development (Reitano, 1995), provided it is integrated 
with other controls, and accurately reflects the potential for damage in premium levels. 
This has worked effectively in the USA with the National Flood Insurance Program, 
which was created to transfer public flood disaster assistance costs to floodplain users. It 
makes Federally backed flood insurance available to property owners in communities that 
adopt and enforce flood loss techniques for new and existing buildings (Thomas, 1995b). 
While in many cases necessary for the recovery of affected communities, financial 
assistance from Central Government or insurance payouts do nothing to reduce the 
flood hazard. By reducing the socio-economic impacts of the flood, this can actually 
encourage repair and rebuilding of at-risk property (Bell, 1999, Ward, 1978). It can also 
create an expectation that aid will be available after future disasters, and may even 
encourage more development, as occupiers come to understand that they can gain the 
benefits of flood-prone land use, but will be compensated for damage caused by disaster 
(Bell, 1999). 
Finally, the monetary compensation of flood damage has little effect'on the intangible 
impacts of flooding, such as the stress and fear, and the feeling of insecurity created. 
2.3 The Problem of Existing At-Risk Development 
Mitchell & al. (1978) noted (p98); 
"the dilemma of what to do about existing development in areas prone to flooding. These areas can be 
zoned to prohibit fuither development, but other atjjustments are necessary to alleviate the danger of 
flooding and damage to existing structures. " 
This will become an increasing problem in the future of flood hazard management, 
caused by: 
i) Global climate change producing greater climatic extremes, including increases in 































ii) Increased flood frequency and magnitude, caused by anthropogenic changes to the 
catchment area and river channel; and 
iii) Increased development and value of land in areas that were thought to be hazard 
free. 
The traditional attraction of riverside locations for development has long faded in 
developed countries, with technological advances allowing the easy transport of water to 
distant areas. Changing land use from intensive, vulnerable development in flood prone 
areas to flood tolerant uses in line with the principle·s of sustainable development would 
appear an efficacious method of adapting to the changes described above. The simplest 
method of implementing this is relocation of at-risk developments and activities to areas 
that are not at risk from flooding. Suggested examples include urban renewal 
programmes which replace buildings with open spaces, such as gardens and car parks 
(Ward, 1978), or large scale industrial relocation to council/ government owned areas 
(Mitchell & al., 1978). 
The major problems with this change of land use are the sheer cost involved, and the 
social and economic upheaval that would result. An established settlement has little 
chance of being relocated, as the huge investment in the existing infrastructure and 
services is not lightly abandoned, and owners are not anxious to move at their own 
expense (Burton, 1965, p88). The costs of relocation must be balanced against the costs 
of alternative measures and the reluctance of some to move (Bell, 1999), and, even if 
implemented, this process can only operate very slowly in an already developed area, 
unless large scale compulsory purchase and redevelopment is carried out (Ward, 1978). 
This is unlikely to be carried out by local government without external funding. There is 
also the issue of costs and land use control being split between different levels of 
government. 
In addition to the severe economic constraints to resettlement and land use change, 
social resistance is also likely to be extreme (Ericksen, 1986), and in many cases, the 
inconvenience of being flooded occasionally is preferred to these costs (Bell, 1999). 
Cohabitation with the damage of past disasters is termed geographical inertia, either 





























(Alexander, 1993). Reasons for this can include a lack of awareness of the hazard, a lack 
of suitable alternatives, a lack of resources to adopt these alternatives, a focus on short-
term objectives, high ratios of benefits to potential losses, or becoming resilient to the 
damages inflicted by the hazard (Alexander, 1993). This demonstrates the barriers to 
reducing flood damage potential in established urban areas. 
This dilemma is recognised in the natural hazards literature ( e.g. Ericksen, 1986, 
Alexander, 1993), yet no uniformly accepted methodologies for dealing with it have been 
developed. As succinctly stated by Burton (1965), "there is no acceptable and simple 
view of the flood problem". While there has been extensive investigation into the 
prevention of creating new developments at risk from flooding, little study has been 
done on the management of existing developments threatened by increasing flood 
hazards. Some researchers accept that structural control measures are the only viable 
option for the protection of existing urban areas (e.g. Marco & Cayuela, 1992), but ignore 
the self-perpetuating 'catastrophe potential' loop that can develop. Others stress the 
theoretical importance of relocation and flood proofing, but admit that the realistic 
constraints are often insurmountable (e.g. Alexander, 1993, Bell, 1999, Gruntfest, 2000). 
In Chapter Three, the history of flood hazard management, and the statutory and 
administrative context in New Zealand are described, including the evolution of natural 



























Flood Hazard Management in New Zealand. 
Flooding has been a constant threat since the first European settlement in New Zealand. 
As such, there is a long history of organised institutional and legislative response. This 
will be considered in two parts; the historical development of flood hazard management, 
and the post-Resource Management Act 1991 (RJV[A) natural hazard management 
regime. These are reviewed to show the changing concepts of flood management in New 
Zealand, and to demonstrate the conflict between increasing natural hazards and existing 
development. 
3.1 Historical Development of Flood Hazard Management 
The first settlements in New Zealand were established almost exclusively on coastal 
floodplains near major rivers. These locations provided the necessities to establish 
civilisation; flat land, rich alluvial soils, a ready supply of fresh water, and access to 
shipping. However, river works were required almost immediately to protect these 
settlements from flooding (Acheson, 1968). By 1870, over 1000 recorded drownings had 
occurred in New Zealand rivers (Cumberland, 1985) and drowning had become known 
as "the New Zealand death" (Waugh & al, 1997). Considerable flood damage occurred 
during the 1860s and 1870s, due to both the siting of settlements in inherently hazardous 
locations, and human impacts on the hydrological cycle, such as upper catchment 
clearance and the resulting acceleration of runoff, erosion and sedimentation (Waugh & 
al, 1997, Mosely & Pearson, 1997). 
As development proceeded, landowners at risk began to form groups so as to better 
provide protection from flooding. River boards and trusts were formed under the 





























(Acheson, 1968). The first regional flood management legislation, the Canterbury Rivers 
Act, was also passed in that year (Mosely & Pearson, 1997). In 1876, with the 
reorg,rnisation of the provincial system, these river boards were formally recognised by 
central government, and in some cases received government funding for projects. The 
River Boards Acts of 1884 and 1908 consolidated enactments relating to river board 
constitutions and river works (Acheson, 1968). However, the limited extent of area 
controlled by these early.boards resulted in inefficient design works, and encouraged 
amalgamation of authorities to form larger, more effective bodies (Acheson, 1968). 
Works performed in this era helped protect urban areas subject to severe flooding, but 
gave little concern to the state of the catchment. By this time there had already been a 
major change in the character of river catchments, caused by clearing and burning of 
bush, mining, heavy stocking and the introduction of noxious animals (Acheson, 1968). 
Flooding problems continued to be a national concern. A Royal Commission appointed 
in 1919 produced a series of reports on a number of South Island rivers to ascertain 
causes of flooding and erosion, and methods to safeguard against this. The main 
conclusion was that increased siltation from mining and land use change was the main 
cause of increased flooding. However, as there was no national authority to sponsor and 
guide river work, no action was taken. (Acheson, 1968, Waugh & al, 1997). 
It was only in the 1930s that reports to government caused a Parliamentary Select 
Committee to be established to investigate flooding. This led to the passing of the Soil 
Conservation and Rivers Control Act (SC&RC) in 1941, then considered one of the most 
advanced pieces of legislation of this type in the world, bringing together soil 
conservation, river control and land drainage under unified control at both local and 
national levels (Waugh & al, 1997). It established the Soil Conservation and Rivers 
Control Council as the central authority, and catchment boards to plan and carry out 
works under this general supervision and direction. This Act allowed catchment boards 
to minimise and prevent damage from floods and erosion, by granting them the same 
powers as local authorities in order to control the flow of water, and provide river works, 
as deemed necessary (Acheson, 1968). 
Catchment authority control, however, was not mandatory, and was only adopted in 

















covered. This was .due to concern over the wide powers given to catchment authorities, 
granting them the authority to set rates, control land use and restrict private property 
rights (Ericksen, 1986). Despite further coercion by way of the Water Soil and 
Conservation Act 1967, and the 1973 Amendment to this making catchment authorities 
mandatory, it was only during the early 1980s that almost all of New Zealand was 
covered (Ericksen, 1986). 
The SC&RC Act 1941 promoted development and gave little consideration to the effects 
of intensification of development on the flood hazard. Extensive river control schemes 
on most large rivers from 1950 to 1980 encouraged intensified use of high quality farm 
land and contributed to increased post-war economic prosperity (Waugh & al, 1997). 
However, the effectiveness of catchment authorities in reducing the flood hazard was 
limited by several factors. Their efficiency was progressively eroded by the growth of 
both themselves and central government. By the 1980s, this, and the multi-layered dual 
administrative structure they operated under made even routine requests problematic, 
with lengthy delays (Ericksen, 1986). Also, Catchment Authorities usually adopted the 
engineering approach to flood hazard management, and considered that many of the 
existing flood hazards could only be mitigated by further river control scheme 
construction (SC&RCC, 1968, Ericksen, 1986). However, a strong change of views 
occurred in the 1970s, when river control policy affecting urban areas was formally 
altered to encourage territorial authorities to consider other measures (Ericksen, 1986). 
This changing approach to the flood hazard also influenced land use planning and 
management in New Zealand. The 1966 Amendment to the Town and Country Planning 
Act (TCP A) 19 53 required councils to 'provide against' land being used for unsuitable 
purposes. Development on land liable to inundation was deemed to be unsuitable, and 
councils were given the ability to map known flood limits. However, resistance to 
regional council formation, the delays in implementing operative district schemes, and a 
reliance on general planning frameworks over locally developed schemes prevented 
district and regional plans having any major influence on the adoption of land use 
planning and management as tools for hazard management (Ericksen, 1986). Specific 
requirements for this approach, and a general strengthening of planning legislation, 
occurred with the TCPA, 1977. This reaffirmed the need to control development in 






















to identify hazards, and identify areas where development should be restricted, determine 
appropriate land usage, and create rules determining land use restrictions in hazard-prone 
areas (Ministry of Works and Development, 1985, in Chapman, 1995). This was 
complemented by the Local Government Act 1979, which gave councils the ability to set 
subdivision and building codes, and allowed implementation of urban renewal and 
acquisition and relocation. However, several constraints prevented the enactment of 
these methods. They included the perceived infringement of private property rights, 
concern and confusion over legal and liability issues, and the predominance of the 
engineering viewpoint (Ericksen, 1986). Although opportunity for change existed, it was 
noted that "legislation by itself will not solve the flooding problem" (ibid, p159). 
Throughout this development, the existence of a separate body charged with solving 
flooding problems that was set upon engineering solutions, and the reluctance of local 
bodies in adopting land use planning as a viable alternative, led to the situation where 
many of New Zealand's urban areas have remained at risk from flooding . 
3.2 Hazard Management under the Resource Management Act 1991 
3.2.1 The Resource Management Act 
The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) was hailed upon its enactment as one of the 
most advanced pieces of resource management legislation in the world. It replaced more 
than twenty major statutes and fifty other laws relating to the environment. These 
previous laws and administering agencies had developed in an uncoordinated manner, 
resulting in an ad hoc approach to environmental management, creating considerable 
conflicts, gaps and overlaps (Ministry for the Environment, 1999). The RMA set out to 
create a new streamlined, integrated and comprehensive approach incorporating the 
concepts of sustainable management (Ministry for the Environment, 1999), while 
building on previous planning experience and mechanisms. However, one drawback of 
this is that many facets of the RMA lack established case law to guide policy 
























Resource management under the authority of the RMA is carried out through an 
interlocking hierarchy of plans and policy documents. These occur at national, regional 
and district levels, with the requirement that each level is not inconsistent with those 
above it (i.e. district plans must not be inconsistent with national or regional documents, 
and regional plans and policy statements must not be inconsistent with national plans 
and policy statements). 
The natural hazard provisions in the RMA are intended to allow individuals and councils 
to balance the benefits and costs of permitting activities in flood-prone areas (Blakely, 
1994), and encourage people to avoid situations where they or their property is placed at 
unacceptable risk (Phizacklea, 2001) . 
3.2.2 Definition of Natural Hazards 
Section 2 of the RMA defines a natural hazard as; 
"at})' atmospheric or earth or water related occurrence (including earthquake, tsunami, 
erosion, volcanic and geothermal activity, landslip, subsidence, sedimentation, wind, 
drought,fire or flooding, the action ef which adversejy ajfects or mqy adversejy ajfect 
human life, property, or other aspects ef the environment' 
This incorporates the main points of literature definitions discussed earlier, and also 
includes adverse effects on environmental aspects, reflecting the holistic intentions of the 
RMA. However, the Section 2 definition is inconsistent with that given in Section 106 of 
the RMA, which restricts the ability of territorial authorities to grant subdivisions in 
certain circumstances relating to certain specified hazards. The definition in Section 106 
appears to be taken directly from the subdivision restrictions of the Local Government 
Act 1974, apparently the result of 'sloppy drafting' (Edmonds & al, 1994). The result of 
this is the inability of a consent authority to refuse a subdivision consent for a property 
that is subject to a natural hazard not listed in Section 106 (ibid). 
In the Application 1?y Canterbury R.egional Council (1995), the Planning Tribunal concluded 
that a natural hazard and its effects are two separate and identifiable entities (Cowper, 




























management, which defines a natural hazard by its effects or potential effects. This 
approach has the potential to cause difficulties when integrating the management of 
natural hazards between district and regional levels. 
3.2.3 Division of Responsibilities 
Natural hazard management responsibilities lie with government, and are different at 
each level. Although the major responsibility lies with local government, central 
government is intended to have a role, even though this is not stated explicitly in 
legislation (Bewick, 1990). While the enactment of the RMA has devolved much 
decision-making power to local government, the New Zealand government retains a 
fundamental responsibility to protect the security, safety and welfare of its citizens and 
communities (MEM, 2000). This is accomplished through the following: 
>, Developing legislation enabling effective natural hazard management practices 
through the Ministry for the Environment (e.g. RMA Amendments); 
>, Provision of centrally co-ordinated emergency management services such as the 
Ministry of Emergency Management; 
>, Financial relief programs, provided after disasters. 
At local government level, natural hazard management is designed to be a shared and co-
ordinated activity between regional and district councils, each with complementary and 
overlapping responsibilities. The RMA contains explicit descriptions of the functions of 
regional and district councils. The functions of regional councils are stated in section 
30(1) of the RMA. The subsection relevant to natural hazards is; 
(c) The control ef the use ef land for the purpose ef-
(iv) The avoidance or mitigation ef natural hazards 
Different regulations exist in respect to the coastal marine area. Catchment and regional 
water board functions were absorbed into regional councils with local government 


























Territorial authority functions are stated in Section 31, and include; 
(b) The control of a1!)1 actual or potential effects of the use, development, or 
protection of land, includingfor the purpose of the avoidance or mitigation of 
natural hazards. 
This difference in wording ("control of the use of land" in Section 30, compared to 
'control of any ... effects of the ... use of land' in Section 31) has created some confusion 
over the appropriate division of responsibility between local government levels. While 
some initially considered that this difference was not significant and that both levels of 
local government were responsible for natural hazard management (Edmonds & al, 1994, 
Blakely, 1994), several actions were undertaken to clarify the situation. The 1993 
Amendment to the RMA addressed this issue through regional policy statements in 
Section 62; 
(ha) For the region or a1!)1 part of the region, which local authority shall have 
responsibility within its own area for developing oijectives, policies, and rules 
relating to the control of the use of land for-
(i) The avoidance of mitigation of natural hazards -
and mqy state particular responsibilities for particular haZflrds ... ; but if no 
responsibilities are identified in the poliry statement, the regional council shall 
retai.n primary responsibility for the hazard. 
This identifies the regional council as the 'default option' for natural hazard management 
responsibility, unless the Regional Policy Statement (RPS) specifically states that a local 
authority shall have responsibility. While this has been described as the key to the 
resolution of the problem of overlapping responsibilities (Edmonds & al, 1994), in the 
case of disputes or inconsistencies in plans, while Section 75(2) provides a technical 
response, this may not result in the development of workable solutions (Cowper, 1995) . 
The respective councils still must come to a practicable agreement on how to deal with 
natural hazards. 
The issue of respective roles was also addressed in Application 'f?y Canterbury Regional Council 





























cannot include rules in a regional plan which restrict activities for the purpose of 
mitigating the effects of natural hazards. A regional council could only control land use 
for the purpose of controlling or mitigating occurrences which constitute a hazard, and 
not for preventing loss or damage (Cowper, 1995). The Canterbury Regional Council 
argued that the effect of a natural hazard is not separable from its occurrence and must 
be managed as such. The decision of the Planning Tribunal was that the omission to 
refer to the effects of natural hazards in relation to regional councils was a deliberate 
distinction intended by Parliament (Cowper, 1995). 
The decision was appealed, and although natural hazards were not specifically considered 
by the Court of Appeal, other subsections of Section 30(1)(c) were, and the logic and 
conclusions reached can be applied to Section 30(1)(c)(iv) (Cowper, 1995). The Court 
stated that despite the wording of Section 31(b), it is difficult to see how a territorial 
authority could control the effects of use without regulating the use itself (i.e. separating 
the control of the effects of land from the control of land use is not always possible) 
(Cowper, 1995). 
Regional Councils 
• Hazards of regional level significance 
• Research into natural hazards, and 
dissemination of information 
• Regional policy development 
• Works and services at regional level 
• Regional civil defence and monitoring 
• Regional advocacy and education 
• Preparation of regional plans 
• Maintaining a regional hazards register 
District Councils 
• Hazards of district level significance 
• Implementation of detailed hazard 







Hazard management plans 
Works and services at district level 
Control of regulatory methods such as 
Building Codes 
Provision of information on site 
specific and localised natural hazards 
Maintaining a district hazards register 
Table 1: Division ef natural hazard responsibilities between regional and distn'ct authon'ties 

























While this was occurring, however, the majority of natural hazard responsibility divisions 
were well understood, and adopted by regional and district councils seeking practical 
interpretation of the legislation. A summary of these is shown in Table 1. Section 62(ha) 
of the RMA appears to have allowed the creation of a workable agreement between 
regional and district councils. 
3.2.4 Legislative Tools 
Effective mechanisms for preventing development in flood-prone areas are provided by 
the Resource Management Act, and the Building Act 1991. The relevant sections of these 
Acts allow consent authorities to control or restrict subdivision and building where a 
hazard is perceived. 
Section 106 ofthe RMA restricts the granting of subdivision consents where the land is, 
or is likely to be, subject to certain natural hazards. Subsection 2 states that before a 
subdivision is granted, the consent authority must be satisfied that the natural hazards 
listed in subsection 1 will be 'avoided, remedied or mitigated' by rules in the district plan, 
resource consent conditions, or works. However, no guidance is given by the RMA over 
the degree of mitigation required. It is considered that the Environment Court would 
demand a high level of mitigation, and that a council would be prudent to adopt 
avoidance as the standard (Edmonds & al, 1994). 
The Building Act is considered to be more prescriptive and regulatory than the RMA 
(Chapman, 1995). While the RMA can be used to protect society from natural hazards 
with flexible implementation at local level, the Building Act enables people to accept the 
risk posed by hazards (Chapman, 1995). Section 36(1) of the Building Act instructs a 
territorial authority to refuse to grant a building consent if the land in question is subject 
to, or is likely to accelerate, worsen, or result in a specified natural hazard, unless it is 
satisfied that adequate provision has or will be made to protect both that land or other 
properties from the hazard. Subsection (2) allows a building consent to be granted where 
the land is subject to, or likely to be subject to, these hazards, provided that the District 
Land Registrar is notified, and a special entry made on the certificate of title. The New 
Zealand Building Code, clause E1.3.2, specifically requires measures to be taken to 

























achieve more restrictive criteria than that stated in the Building Code, except for the 
protection of adjoining properties from surface flooding (Sections 7(2), 68(2A) and 
76(2A)) (Sheldon, 1994). 
Natural Hazards can also be controlled through regional or district plans, and conditions 
on consents. Methods available for this include; 
• The provision of information on hazards, kept as a requirement of section 3SG) 






Education of the public about the risk of natural hazards, and actions that may be 
taken to minimise vulnerability. This may encourage changes in behaviour, 
particularly in developed areas (Edmonds & al, 1994) . 
Regulation, including zoning of hazard-prone land, requirement of information 
with resource consent applications, and allowing flood protection works to be 
permitted activities. 
The establishment or enhancement of structural event modification works . 
However, these actions are subject to the matters of Section 32 of the RMA to 
ensure that they are necessary, effective and efficient (Edmonds & al, 1994). 
Section 220 of the RMA sets out conditions that may be imposed on subcllvision 
consents. These can include requiring esplanade strips or reserves to be set aside 
to mitigate natural hazards, requirements such as location or minimum floor 
levels of any buildings, the establishment of structural works, or a condition that 
provision be made for the protection of all or part of the land, or other land, 
against certain hazards, including inundation, to the satisfaction of the council 
(Edmonds & al, 1994) . 
The RMA and BA provide local government with the power to manage natural hazards 
by placing controls on subdivision and building on flood-prone land. However, where 
existing developments are threatened by newly created flood hazards, the methods 
available to councils to manage this are restricted to providing information and 



























The RMA does not exempt territorial authorities from civil liability for granting a 
subdivision consent under Section 106 (Edmonds & al, 1994). Concern was expressed 
during the assessment of the Resource Management Bill that the greater responsibility of 
local authorities to provide information on hazards would make them vulnerable to 
claims of negligence (Bewick, 1990). Consideration was given to protecting local 
authorities and their staff from such liability, but the Crown enacted no such provisions, 
deciding that where local government acts in a technically competent and professional 
manner, such protection is unnecessary (ibid). 
The Building Act exempts territorial authorities from civil liability associated with the 
issue of a building consent with knowledge that the building may be at risk from a natural 
hazard, provided the procedures of Section 36 have been followed correctly and that 
damage arises from the natural hazard referred to on the certificate of title (Edmonds & 
al, 1994). 
Each of these methods require that the consent authority be 'satisfied' of certain matters. 
To insure reasonable grounds of satisfaction, a council must make the necessary inquiries 
and use all information that it has available concerning the associated risks (Edmonds & 
al, 1994). 
Despite the prescriptions of the RMA, there are several outstanding issues associated 
with natural hazard management by local authorities. In the ten years that the legislation 




Is the common law duty of care negated with warning applicants of the risk? 
Does council have to go further than warning, and share any information it has 
concerning the risk? 
Should public money be spent protecting private assets? 





























• Should the Crown or local authorities provide compensation for damage to 
interests in land resulting from the provision of, or failure to provide, structural 
works? 
(From Rice, 2001, p102) 
The question of liability is of importance to local authorities, whose actions must be both 
defensible, and shown to.be necessary (Section 32, RMA). With an increasingly legalistic 
approach to land management in New Zealand, these issues may create uncertainty 
amongst regulatory bodies, hindering their effectiveness in managing natural hazards . 
3.2.6 Existing use rights 
While the mechanisms given to local authorities are considered effective in preventing 
new development in flood-prone areas, there has been no provision made for dealing 
with existing developments that have become at risk due to changing flood 
characteristics, either natural or anthropogenic. Ericksen (1986) stated that although it 
would be in the national interest to relocate flood-prone development, the real problem 
is that no formal mechanism exists within existing flood-loss policy to provide the 
economic incentives for such relocation. It appears that fifteen years and a complete 
legislative change have not addressed this issue. 
Rather, a different perspective has been adopted, whereby structures and activities 
established prior to the RMA are specifically exempt from having to comply with this 
legislation under the provisions of Section 10. 
(1) Land mqy be used in a manner that contravenes a rule in a district plan or 
proposed district plan if -
(a) Either-
(i) The use was laeful!J established before the rule became 
operative or the proposed plan was notified; and 
M The effects of the use are the same or similar in 

























before the rule became operative or the proposed plan 
was notified. 
This protection is dependant on the structure or activity having been lawfully established 
prior to the rule it contravenes, and "the effects of use" being "the same or similar in 
character, intensity and scale". 
The implications of this for natural hazard management are demonstrated in McKinlay v 
Timaru District Council, 2001. This case concerned how existing use rights under Section 
10 of the RMA apply to the reconstruction of a building which is destroyed by a natural 
hazard, such as a flood, where such reconstruction is otherwise prohibited by a rule in 
the proposed District Plan. The importance of Section 10( 4) (a) on this case was noted; 
(4) For the avoidance ef doubt, this section does not appfy to a1!)l use ef land that 
is; 
(a) Controlled under section 30(1)(c) (regional control ef 
certain land uses) 
In this case, the Regional Policy Statement contained objectives, policies and methods 
(but not rules) as to how natural hazards should be managed. The District Council 
argued that rules in a regional plan were not necessary to control the use of land in 
relation to natural hazards, as Section 75(2)(c) of the RMA requires that "a district plan 
must not be inconsistent with the regional policy statement", and regional council 
control came through district plan rules not being inconsistent with the objectives, 
policies and methods of the Regional Policy Statement. 
However, the Environment Court decided that this did not amount to actual control by 
the regional council, as Section 68 of the RMA recognises that control of a land use 
requires such rules in a regional plan, and that there was a difference between having a 
right to control, and exercising that right. The decision stated that, 
"despite the provisions ef the proposed district plan, the existing use rights under section 10 of the 























of a1!J existing houses by . . . natural hazards provided that the dwelling to be rebuilt is the 
same or similar in character, intensity, and scale as that which presentfy stands" 
It was mentioned that the situation might be different if there was a relevant proposed 
regional plan, and Section 20(2)(c) applied. In this case, an application for a resource 
consent for the continuation of the activity would be required within six months of 
rebuilding. However, this method of restricting redevelopment has not been tested 
before the Environment Court, and the extent and duration of the existing use rights 
would need to be determined (McKinlqy vs. Timaru District Council, 2001). 
This decision demonstrates that if the risk of a natural hazard to existing development is 
perceived, while a district council can prevent new development by implementing 
changes to the district plan, existing development is protected by Section 10. Even if the 
buildings are damaged or destroyed by the natural hazard identified by the rule, a council 
cannot prevent their repair or reconstruction. It can be seen that the issues raised earlier 
in this Chapter are applicable in this situation. With no established case law or legislative 
tools to deal with this situation, councils must attempt to manage these situations 
pragmatically, within their resources. This has the potential to lead to uncoordinated 
responses, and of councils effectively 'reinventing the wheel' . 
3.3 Conclusion 
The RMA and Building Act provide local government with a range of legislative and 
statutory tools for firstly, reducing exposure to natural hazards, and secondly, allowing 
acceptance of a certain degree of risk. 
Flood management in New Zealand has been a concern since first European settlement, 
and there is a long history of institutional and legislative response. From an early 
'engineering focussed' approach, based on the maximum use of flood prone land, a 
change occurred towards land use and planning controls to lessen the flood risk 
potential. However, despite the opportunity for change, these non-structural approaches 
















The post-1991 natural hazards regime (Resource Management Act and Building Act) has 
replaced this with a process whereby new developments must 'satisfy' the consent 
granting authority that the vulnerability to flooding has been reduced below a specified 
level. However, in the case of existing development, council methods are limited to the 
provision of information and the establishment of structural protection works. They lack 
the process to even prevent a building that has been destroyed by a recognised natural 
hazard being rebuilt, due to the interpretation of Section 10 of the RNlA.. 
Chapter Four presents the methodology for the research project. This describes and 
justifies both the primary and secondary data collection techniques, and the method of 
analysis of the results. 




















The purpose of this study is to determine the response of a local authority, within the 
constraints of statutory and legislative boundaries, to an increased flood hazard that 
threatens an established urban area. From an understanding of the dynamics of this 
response, and reasons for actions taken, mechanisms will be identified that other local 
authorities can adopt in response to situations of this type. This study involves an in-
depth examination of statuary bodies managing a situation not provided for in legislation, 
and an examination of the reasons for responses that have occurred. 
The research also involves a significant empirical component; it includes factual 
observations of a real world context - Alexandra, where three serious flood events in 
1994, 1995 and 1999 have prompted responses at community, local government and 
central government levels. The study seeks to understand and explain these responses 
through analysis. A qualitative methodology focussing on interpretation and 
understanding is employed to explore the relationships between the organisations 
involved and the increased flood hazard. 
4.1 Research Methods 
This study generates data from both primary and secondary sources. The use of multiple 
methods allows corroboration and augmentation of data through the process of 
triangulation, whereby separate investigative methods converge on the object of study, 
allowing a higher degree of validity and reliability to be achieved, and a variety of 















4.1.1 Secondary Source Material 
Secondary data sources are employed to review flood management and natural hazards 
research theory, and the New Zealand historical natural hazard management legislation 
to determine: 
• The current concepts and paradigms relating to natural hazards theory; 
• If procedures to resolve conflict between established urban areas and 
increasing natural hazards have been determined, and; 
• The statutory and legislative context within which local bodies in New 
Zealand are constrained. 
This approach is taken to avoid the duplication of previous work, and provide a 
foundation on which to base this study. This information also provides a context from 
which empirical research can be conducted more effectively by identifying gaps in 
existing knowledge (Stewart & Kamins, 1993). 
Secondary data sources consulted include the following: 
Documentation 
This data source has the advantage of stability, broad coverage of the topic, and of 
including a body of professional literature existing independently of the study (Yin, 
1994). 
The literature consulted in this study can be categorised into several primary topic areas; 
• That relating to natural hazard theory research. This has developed from the late 
1940s onwards, and combines the fields of science, engineering, economics, planning 
and social sciences, 
• Literature specifically related flood management and control, which draws on the 
fields of planning and engineering, and 



















Records of past flood events provide details and factual accounts of the occurrence and 
effects of flooding in the study area to establish causal links with the actions of interested 
parties. The main sources of these records are ORC reports and newspaper stories. 
4.1.2 Primary Source Material 
The empirical research for this project consists of a case study of the response of 
institutional bodies to an increased flood hazard in Alexandra. A case study was chosen 
as it offers a distinct advantage where empirical information about responses connected 
with a contemporary phenomenon is required to answer 'how' and 'why' questions (Yin, 
1994). It can also be used to gain insights with wider implications than the particular case 
studied (Denscombe, 1998). 
"the essence ef a case stucfy ... is that it tries to illuminate a decision, or set ef 
derisions: why thry were taken, how thry were implemented, and with what results" 
(Schramm, 1971, in Yin, 1994.) 
Although the case study approach has been criticised for possessing a lack of objectivity 
and rigor, it is recognised as an essential form of social science inquiry (Yin, 1993), 
appropriate when the investigation is to: 
(a) define topics broadly; 
(b) study both the phenomenon of interest and the contextual conditions as one 
unit, and not just aspects of this; 
(c) perceive the respondents as experts, not merely as sources of data, and; 
(d) study a typical case. 
(From Yin, 1993, Sarantakos, 1993) 
Information collected from archival and documentation sources is supported and 
expanded on through key informant interviews. Interviewees were selected from the 
statutory groups (Otago Regional Council (ORC), Central Otago District Council 


















response to flooding in Alexandra through their statutory obligations, based on their 
personal involvement in, and experience of the issue. It became clear early in the 
investigation that several key people were 'at the heart of the matter' (D. Whitney, 2001, 
pers. comm.), being involved in both the formulation of the Central Otago District Council 
response, and in negotiations with Central Government as representatives of the 
Alexandra Community Board. Other interviewees were involved in the planning and 
natural hazards management framework, including the formulation of the Central Otago 
District Plan, and at the District Council and Regional Council levels. A list of those 
interviewed is presented in Appendix 1. In some cases, several people from the same 
organisation were interviewed in order to give a robust, three-dimensional insight into 
the response to the increased flood hazard in Alexandra, as well as any perceived 
limitations imposed by relevant legislation or duties oflocal government. 
The interviews were semi-structured. This involved a clear list of issues to be discussed, 
and possible questions (Appendix 2), but also allowed flexibility to discuss other issues 
and develop points of interest more fully (Denscombe, 1998). Respondents were 
interviewed solely in their professional capacity, about understandings of relationships 
and context, and reasons for actions or lack of action taken. The interviews were 
conducted at a place specified by the respondent, usually council offices. A reciprocal 
approach was adopted for the interviews, with both parties demonstrating knowledge on 
the topic and sharing interpretations and ideas. This minimised repetition of facts while 
encouraging the interviewee to add to the research knowledge by expanding on ideas and 
presenting interpretations of events. 
4.2 Data Analysis 
Key interview notes were analysed for information concerning the research objectives. 
This information was sorted under suitable topic headings, assembling multi-faceted 
views of the major issues concerning the response to flooding. Different interviewees 
addressing the same topics of importance allowed a more complete understanding of the 
information to emerge than would otherwise have been the case. This also allowed the 



















These topics were then compared with the theoretical foundations of flood hazard 
management determined in Chapters Two and Three, and their relationship with these 
allowed the determination of conclusions addressing the research objectives to be 
developed. 
The next Chapter consists of a description of the Alexandra township context, including 
the causes of the increased flood hazard, the timing and effects of the flooding, and the 
















The Alexandra Case Study 
5.1 Historical Flooding 
Situated on the banks of the Clutha River, the largest in New Zealand, Alexandra has 
been subject to severe flooding in the past. In 1878, the largest ever recorded flow 
flooded the infant town and causing considerable damage. This flood had an estimated 
peak flow of 4600 cumecs, compared with a normal flow of under 400 cumecs. All 
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Figure 4; Peak River Flows for Recorded Floods at Alexandra (data from ORC, 2000) 
The occurrence of three major flood events between 1994 and 1999 demonstrated 
beyond doubt the presence of an increased flood hazard, and prompted action by local 
government. Accordingly, it is seen as being an ideal case through which to study local 
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Figure 5; Location map 
On 10th January 1994, torrential rain caused widespread flooding throughout Otago, 
Fiordland and Southland (ODT, 10/1 / 94, Rain lashes Otago & Fiordland). Flooding, 
combined with slips and lightning strikes (King, 1994) resulted in a declaration of a state 
of emergency in Alexandra due to the flooding of the water pumps at the town's 
borefield (ODT, 11-1-94, Emergency in Alexandra). Three thousand people, mainly on 
holiday, were evacuated, and four houses and the Alexandra Jaycees clubrooms were 

































level at the Alexandra Bridge with a maximum of 2373 cumecs passing through the Clyde 
Dam (Galer, 1994, Opus, 2000). 
Alexandra was flooded again on the 13th December 1995, with a record 67.7mm of rain 
falling in 24 hours (Stevens, 1995). This was described as 'the worst flood in the 131 year 
history of the town' with the Alexandra Museum, the Bendigo Hotel, several businesses 
and shops and over a dozen houses being flooded (Fridd, 1995b). The Clutha River 
peaked at 3550 cumecs, and the plaque marking the peak of the 1878 flood was 
submerged as the Clutha rose to RL 141.9m at the Alexandra Bridge (Duggan, 1995a). 
Some places 'flood-proofed' after the 1994 floods, or above the flood risk area, were 
flooded (Fridd, ibid). 
A 72 hour rainstorm over Otago and Fiordland created a major flood on the 17th -18th 
November 1999, in Central Otago and Southland (Opus, 2000). A civil emergency was 
declared on the 17th in Alexandra, with the Bendigo Hotel and twenty-nine businesses in 
lower Tarbert Street, Limerick Street and Althone Street flooded (King, 1999). Several 
hundred residents were evacuated, water supplies were cut, and many roads were closed. 
Queenstown and Wanaka were also flooded, with the highest recorded level on Lake 
Wakatipu since 1878, and Lake Wanaka exceeding the 1878 level by 2cm. At Alexandra, a 
peak flow of 3800 cumecs created a peak flood level ofRL 142.3m, higher than both the 
1995 and 1878 floods (Opus, 2000). 
5.2 The Increased Flood Hazard 
5.2.1 Roxburgh Dam 
The Roxburgh Dam was commissioned in 1956, in order to' meet the power needs of a 
rapidly developing post World War Two economy. Although it was well known at the 
time that the Clutha was subject to extreme flows on a regular basis, and carried a high 
sediment load, construction of the dam was carried out, most probably due to the 
extreme confidence in the power of engineering projects to harness nature in this era. 
The original intent to manage any increased flooding from this was to purchase land 




















140.3m, thought to have been equivalent to the 1878 flood level (various reports and 
memoranda, Ministry of Works and other Crown agencies, in CSC, 2000). This was soon 
found to be too low a level, primarily due to the accumulation of sediment in the upper 
reaches of Lake Roxburgh. Further investigations established a new level of RL 141.5m 
at the Manuherikia River Confluence, and in early 1981 approval was granted for 
government purchase of land on this basis. However, this was not carried out for all 
affected land (CSC, 2000). 
5.2.2 Sedimentation as a cause of flooding 
The Clutha is New Zealand's largest catchment, and drains a tectonically active, rapidly 
eroding mountain range. The Shotover is the main sediment source for the Clutha (CSC, 
2000. It carries a huge sediment load that formerly drained to the East Coast, 
replenishing beach sands. However, the construction of dams has interrupted this natural 
process, and trapped the sediment behind the dam. 
The slowing of river water as it first encounters the low velocity flows associated with a 
lake causes sediment to settle out at the upstream end of the lake. This has caused the 
river bed downstream of the Manuherikia River confluence to rise, resulting in 'a 
propensity to flood surrounding land at lower flows than would otherwise be the case' 
(CSC, 2000, p32). This has also caused higher flood levels within Lake Roxburgh, with 
resultant backing up of the river flow (ibidj. It is estimated that 45 million m3 of sediment 
had been deposited behind the Roxburgh Dam before the commissioning of the Clyde 
Dam Qohnstone, 2000). 
This is demonstrated by historical flood data; the 1999 flood peaked at RL 142.25m with 
a flow of 3800 cumecs, while the 1878 flood, with a flow of 4650 cumecs, produced 
flooding to the lower level of RL 140.5m Qohnstone, 2000). It is estimated that the 1999 
flood peak was approximately 3.2m higher than would have occurred had the Roxburgh 
Dam not been constructed (ibidj. 
Construction of the Clyde Dam in 1992 has prevented sediment sourced from the 
Shotover and other upstream catchments from reaching Lake Roxburgh since this time. 





























(Johnstone, 2000). It is significant that two of the worst floods to strike Alexandra have 
occurred after sediment accumulation behind Lake Roxburgh ceased. Indeed, sediment 
within Lake Roxburgh has been redistributed due to the scouring action of the 1994, 
1995 and 1999 floods, progressively reducing flood profiles at Alexandra (ibid). This is 
estimated to have reduced flood levels 1.5m since the commissioning of the Clyde Dam 
(ibid). 
5.3 Institutional Structure 
5.3.1 Otago Regional Council 
Alexandra is situated within the boundaries of the ORC, which contains the entire 
catchment of the Clutha River. The Regional Policy Statement is the main document by 
which the ORC manages the flood hazard. 
Regional Policy Statement (1998) 
Chapter 11 of the RPS deals with natural hazards. It mentions flooding as a serious threat 
to Otago people and communities, and states that it is essential to "avoid or mitigate the 
threat through appropriate means including def enc es against water which need on-going 
maintenance". The role of human activities in forming a hazard is mentioned, as is the 
individual choice of people to balance locational risks and benefits. Responses to the 
likelihood of a natural hazard occurring can take one of three forms (RPS, 11.1): 
1. Avoiding the hazard, through measures such as relocating development away 
from areas under threat of flooding or preventing development in these areas . 
2. Mitigating the impact of the hazard by reducing its effects. The example 
given for this is the construction of stop banks to control floodwaters. 
3. Enduring the event and undertaking cleaning up and rebuilding afterwards. 
This involves civil defence services, and private insurance policies. 














Otago Regional Council; 
• Investigation and provision of information to all agencies on regionally significant 
hazards. 
• Development of objectives and policies for regionally significant mitigation works, 
and land that is affected by inundation. 
• Development of objectives, policies, rules and other methods with respect to 
activities that may exacerbate inundation. 
• Enabling community responses to flood hazard where necessary, subject to the 
requirements of the Rl\1A, such as maintaining or constructing river control schemes. 
Territorial Local Authorities; 
• Preparation of information on site specific and localised hazards that may affect any 
component of the built environment under the Building Act 
• Development of objectives, policies and rules where land is affected by a natural 
hazard, or where development may exacerbate a natural hazard. 
The specific responsibilities concerning the exacerbation of natural hazards are left 
undefined, and are to be determined in response to each specific hazard situation, in 
order to ensure effective and efficient management. Factors influencing the division of 
responsibilities may include the capacity of the authority, acceptability of responsibility, 
the scale of effects, and efficiency and cost minimisation factors. 
Specific issues stated in the RPS of concern to an increasing flood hazard are as follows: 
Issue 11.3.4 states that there are risks to existing developments that can only be dealt 
with through mitigation measures, such as establishing or maintaining structures or 
vegetation to afford protection, taking out insurance to offset losses, or avoiding the 



































Issue 11.3.6 recognises that human activities (here termed 'inappropriate') can increase 
the intensity and frequency of natural hazards. 
Policies addressing these issues are also stated, and are; taking action necessary to avoid 
or mitigate the unacceptable adverse effect of natural hazards and the responses to 
natural hazards on human life and infrastructure and property, restricting developments 
on sites recognised as prone to significant hazards, and establishing the level of natural 
hazard risk that threatened communities are willing to accept. These are to be 
accomplished through a wide range of methods, including constructing river and flood 
control schemes, but focuses on community consultation and education techniques. 
5.3.2 Central Otago District Council 
The Central. Otago District Council administers land use and development control 
through its District Plan. 
Proposed District Plan (1998) 
The Central Otago District Plan groups natural hazards with technological and human 
induced hazards within Section 17: Hazards . 
Flood hazard management is categorised in three ways: 
1) structural responses, such as stopbanks; 
2) non-structural methods, reducing the frequency and intensity of occurrence by the 
use of appropriate land management practices or exclusion or control of 
development in hazard-prone areas; 
3) loss modification through flood warning systems, civil defence responses and 
insurance cover; 
















Flooding is recognised as a hazard (Issue 17.2.1), and both the potential costs of allowing 
development in hazard-prone areas, and the potential lack of awareness of hazards are 
mentioned as issues. The choice of people to accept both the benefits and risks of 
hazard-prone sites is accommodated to some degree through the building and resource 
consent process. 
Planning maps show the highest flood levels recorded for the township, and place 
development restrictions on areas below these lines. These have been updated after each 
floods since 1994. 
5.3.3 Alexandra Community Board 
The CODC has one of the most devolved structures in New Zealand, with community 
boards operating under the delegated authority of the Council. The community boards 
consist of local elected representatives which resolve local issues and make budgetary 
decisions. As such, the Alexandra Community Board had a large role in responding to 
the flood hazard experienced by the Alexandra community. 
Several members of this board are also involved with the Central Otago District Council, 
including District Councillors and the Deputy Mayor, and undertook several roles during 
the flood hazard response. 
5.4 Response to Flooding 
5.4.1 The 1994 Flood 
This led to the commissioning of a joint study by the Electricity Corporation of New 
Zealand (ECNZ) and the Otago Regional Council to assess the causes of flooding in 
Alexandra, covering dam operations and the build up of silt at the head of Lake 
Roxburgh (Duggan, 1994b). This study recommended the scouring of the sediment 
build-up by flushing the lake as the most effective long-term flood reduction solution. It 
concluded that the estimated $1.4 million cost of flood protection works would exceed 











chlorination unit and the switchboard controlling the main sewerage pumps were raised 
1.Sm following the flood (Fridd, 1995a). ECNZ made some ex-gratia payments to flood 
victims, but denied any liability for the flooding. 
5.4.2 The 1995 Flood 
Following this disaster, the ACB called for an independent inquiry into the cause of the 
flooding (Duggan, 1995b), and CODC councillors moved that Contact Energy, the 
company that took over operation of the Clutha dams following privatisation of ECNZ, 
be sent a bill for uninsured flood damage to roads and services (Fridd, 1996a). Contact 
Energy stated that they were not liable for any flood damage caused by dams on the 
Clutha River, but were prepared to negotiate compensation payments with affected 
individuals (Fridd, 1996b). 
Difficult negotiations over compensation and liability between Contact Energy and flood 
victims continued for several years, but by mid-1997 most claimants had managed to 
reach settlement individually (O'Connor, 1997a). The CODC also settled a long-running 
flood compensation dispute with Contact Energy (Smith, 1999), but the Crown refused 
to accept either legal liability or a moral obligation to purchase Council land lying under 
the 141.Sm contour, as it had for private properties in the early 1980s (Duggan, 1999). 
5.4.3 The 1999 Flood 
This was the largest of the three floods, and exceeded the peak level of the previous 
highest flood of 1878. Response to this flooding was united and prompt, in comparison 
to the earlier events of the 1990s. As one interviewee stated," After the bad experience with 
settlements qfter the 199 5 flood, we made a decision not to repeat that". 
Once the immediate flood damage had been dealt with, a public meeting was called by 
the ACB in order to coordinate a community response to the flooding issue. At this 
meeting, the creation of a Clutha Solutions Coordinator position (CSC) was the main 
issue, with a suitable candidate lined up by the ACB. However, no funding was available 


















flooding occurred ten days before the 1999 general election, when Labour replaced 
National as the Government), the Prime Minister appointed Alex Adams to this position 
The CSC was to work closely with the Prime Minister's Department, and was provided 
with resources and payment by the Ministry for Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management. The brief for this position was to investigate practicable long term 
solutions to the flooding with an emphasis on urban areas. Of six key tasks, the fifth was: 
Examining the specific issue of siltation of the k)dro lakes and the repeated flooding at 
Alexandra. 
At this stage, the CODC, on behalf of the ACB, instigated the community driven Future 
Directions Study to investigate possible solutions to protect flood affected properties 
from future inundation. A need was perceived for a report focussing specifically on the 
Alexandra situation, with a maximum of community consultation, in order to develop a 
robust case for compensation. The risk management consultancy, Optimix, was 
employed for this task. 
Clutha Solutions Coordinator (CSC) 
As already noted, this short-term position was created to investigate practical solutions to 
the flood hazard along the Clutha River. All parties interviewed in this study regarded 
this as an extremely effective mechanism for dealing with the situation. Aside from the 
stated objectives, the Coordinator defined the role of this position as having several 
elements. These included; sorting through the available information in a logical and 
unbiased manner to balance misinformation in the community and provide a factual 
basis to discussions; causing the parties responsible for the increased flood hazard to 
front up to their responsibilities, without getting bogged down in either historical 
confrontational positions, or strict legal liability; acting as a facilitator to get the different 
parties focusing on the same issues; and producing a succinct set of recommendations 
that would allow resolution of the issues. 
The main strengths of the position were perceived to be its impartiality, and the short-
term nature of the assignment. As the appointment was agreed on by the three District 















political parties, and while reporting to all of these, separation from any one party was 
effectively maintained. The fact that the position did not involve politics at any level 
allowed tough decisions to be made. The limited duration of the assignment created a 
need to make major decisions based on present facts in order to finish the project with 
an outcome. This limited nature did not permit all final details to be worked out, but it 
did prevent hesitancy in decision making. Other benefits included public accessibility to 
the Coordinator, and the ability to present factual information that was accepted by the 
community . 
Future Directions Study (Optimix, 2000) 
This parallel study was developed by the CODC and the ACB, in consultation with the 
CSC and the ORC, to resolve issues on the future of Alexandra as a result of frequent 
flooding (Optimix, 2000). The stated goal was to protect the community from flooding, 
and to provide a basis for a vibrant community. This was seen as a 'community owned' 
study, and consultation was a vital component, required throughout the report. In all, 144 
formal submissions were made, and an extensive consultation programme, involving 
meetings with the public, sector groups, and affected parties, throughout the report. The 
contract ran from 3rd April to 30th June 2000. 
The scoping report considered four main options: 
o construction of flood defences with associated property purchase; 
o relocation of the town; 
o silt movement from Lake Roxburgh, and; 
o an indemnity fund that would insure against all risks of future flooding. 
Of these, only the construction of flood defences was fully considered, with the 
possibility of future investigation into silt movement. A broad-brush economic 
evaluation was conducted, showing that the indemnity fund gave the most effective rate 
of return of all the options. However, this was not considered a workable option by 
residents who wanted to reduce the flood risk in their community, and not live with the 
flood risk. Neither the relocation of the town, or silt removal, gave positive benefit ratios, 


















movement was not seen as an efficient use of resources. While building flood defences 
was favoured from an early stage, the report also recognised the new risk that would be 
created should flood defences be overtopped. From this basis, detailed costs for flood 
defences were developed in later reports. 
The CSC report, and the Future Directions Strategy were described as a 'two barrel 
approach', providing a case for compensation to the Crown, along with a detailed 
description of how this compensation would be used to alleviate the flood hazard. 
On this basis of these reports, a compensation and redevelopment package of $21.58 
million was made by the Crown to the community of Alexandra for compensation, 
property purchase, protection works, and general matters associated with the flooding. 
Following the recommendations of both the CSC and the Optimix report, structural 
flood defences and purchase of flood prone land were decided on. Construction for this 
began in 2000 with an expected completion date of 2003. 
The proposed stop banks vary in height between 400mm and 4 m above existing ground 
levels. The design flood level is 142.75 m above sea level, and the top level of the flood 
protection will be 500 mm higher than the design flood level, at 143.25. This will allow 
free board to accommodate wave action and settlement. 
Flood-prone properties that were underneath the 'footprint' of the planned flood 
defences, and those that would not be protected by these structures were purchased with 
compensation money. In a change from the Optimix recommendations, those properties 
that were flooded, but judged to be protected by the installation of defences, were not 
purchased. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The Alexandra community, while historically at risk from flooding of the Clutha River, 
suffered three major floods between 1994 and 1999, each of increasing magnitude. 
Throughout this period, a growing realisation of the increased flood hazard to the 
township was confirmed by technical studies. However, no response aside from updating 






















until the 1999 flood. This was due to an uncertainty surrounding liability and respons-
ibility issues for large dams, a divided community pursuing and settling compensation 
cases individually, and a lack of awareness of the degree of increase of the flood hazard. 
The 1999 flood inspired a response driven by the CODC and the Alexandra Community 
Board to gain compensation for flood damages, and to protect the township from the 
increased flood hazard. This response avoided many of the mistakes made following the 
earlier floods, and gathered community and political support to gain funding for two 
parallel studies aimed at building a robust case for compensation to fund protection of 
the township. The CSC report provided an independent assessment of solutions to the 
flooding problem over the entire river catchment, while the community driven Future 
Directions Strategy presented a viable, detailed solution for flooding in Alexandra. 
Together, these reports gained over $21 million in compensation, which was used to 
purchase flood prone properties and construct flood defences to protect the rest of the 
community. 
In Chapter Six, the issues identified from key informant interviews will be discussed and 




















Identification and Analysis of Issues 
From the study of the response to flooding in Alexandra and key informant interviews, 
several issues important in addressing the objectives of this report have been identified. 
These are: 
o effectiveness of the relevant legislation; 
o liability issues concerning natural hazard response; 
o local government roles and responsibilities in relation to natural hazards 
planning; 
o perception of the flood hazard in Alexandra; 
o response by local government in the Alexandra situation; 
o difficulties of responding proactively to increased flood hazards. 
These topics range from specific aspects of the legislative framework to the broad field 
of proactive response by local government. In this manner, a holistic view of the 
complete hazard management process that has existed in Alexandra, and its implications 
for other situations can be analysed. These issues are related to the theoretical basis of 
natural hazards management and discussed in detail below. 
6.1 Local Government Roles and Responsibilities 
6.1.1 Central Otago District Council 
The functions of this local authority were defined as "identifying known hazards and 


















decisions", and "applying knowledge to practical development applications". This is an 
action oriented approach, focussing on land use controls. It was also noted that the 
District Council bears the economic and social costs of flooding, making this control a 
pragmatic method of minimising disruption and uncertainty. This role is accomplished 
through the provision of floodlines on planning maps with related rules and regulations 
in the District Plan, the maintenance of a district hazards register, and the ability to affix 
flood hazard warning notes to the Land Information Memorandums (LIMs) of 
properties considered at risk. 
6.1.2 Otago Regional Council 
The role of the Regional Council was seen by those at the District Council and 
community board levels as that of an expert with technical skills providing relevant data, 
backed up with regulatory functions defined by legislation. An aspect of this role consists 
of making technical information available to the District Council, and performing an 
information verification role on specific sites. Although the responsibility for structural 
defences for flood protection is stated in the Regional Policy Statement as lying with the 
ORC, their inability to control the operation of the Roxburgh Dam due to the special 
enabling legislation that it operates under, and the initial lack of resources, prohibited 
action. As the settlement following the 1999 flood was negotiated between the Alexandra 
Community Board and the Crown, the Regional Council is involved only as a 
'mechanism of implementation' of Crown policy, overseeing the construction of the 
floodbanks, which are still owned by Contact Energy and the Crown. 
There was some criticism of the Regional Council in its fulfilment of these actions, 
specifically a lack of information provision and hazard mapping. On a general level, the 
Regional Council's focus on policy, as opposed to enforceable rules and regulations 
based on technical grounds, was also mentioned. There was concern that this was 
resulting in the development of a gap between the two levels of local government, with 
















6.2 The Effectiveness of Relevant Legislation 
6.2.1 Introduction 
While the natural hazards legislation has been introduced and reviewed in Chapter Three, 
the effectiveness of this when applied in a real world context must be considered. The 
case study has allowed study of the application of the Building Act in an area of 
increasing risk, but as this situation has not involved the granting of subdivision consents 
in flood prone areas, the effectiveness of Section 106 of the RMA cannot be evaluated in 
this study. 
6.2.2 Building Act 1991 
The Building Act 1991 states that building consents cannot be refused on flood prone 
land providing the building does not increase the severity of the problem. The New 
Zealand Building Code requires the floor level of the structure to be above the 2% 
A.E.P. level. In the Alexandra situation, an application lodged for a building consent 
cannot be refused provided floor levels are 300mm above the highest flood level for the 
site. Interview results clearly showed that this legislation does not give the District 
Council power to stop a determined developer, and is only effective when the building is 
likely to accelerate flooding of other properties. The 2% A.E.P. is usually uncertain 
enough so as to be indefensible to legal challenge. As calculated probabilistic risks will 
very rarely coincide with past floodlines, especially in areas of increasing risk, the 
interpretation of these figures are open to dispute when applied to specific sites. This is 
complicated by the likelihood of periodic increases in this level after each flood event in 
areas of increasing risk, meaning that this requirement can become ineffectual after a 
short time period. 
The BA provides a process by which councils can be exempted from liability arising from 
the identified hazard by transferring the risk to the developer. This response was used in 
the Alexandra situation to encumber the LIM with a flood hazard warning, effectively 
transferring risk to the owner or developer of the property. This can be viewed as a 














hence ratepayers, potentially accepting liability for natural disasters and subsidising those 
living at risk. While this approach agrees with the interpretation of the Building Act 
presented by Chapman (1995), it functions by way of a 'market forces' approach where 
citizens balance their perception and comfort with risk against other factors such as the 
value of the property. 
This situation is brought about by the constraints mentioned in Chapter Two; a lack of 
resources by local government, a lack of perception of the true nature of the flood 
hazard, and social resistance to change. With these in effect, the mechanism provided by 
the Building Act 1991 is favoured. This is interpreted as the Council's method of dealing 
with liability in a pragmatic manner, where attempting to stop development or require 
alteration to existing structures may lead to a costly Environment Court case, with no 
certainty of winning. 
6.2.3 Existing Use Rights 
Due to the ability to transfer the risk to building owners, Section 10 of the RMA is not 
perceived as conflicting with natural hazard management in the Alexandra situation. If a 
hazard is perceived, or occurs, the LIM is flagged as above, resulting in the same risk 
transference. From the Council perspective, there is no real concern with the impact of 
this on property values. As owners should have been aware of the risk before purchasing, 
or have had the risk transferred to them since owning, the local authority can refuse to 
take physical action to protect these buildings if it is judged uneconomic or 
unsustainable. There is little guidance in the international literature or case law to either 
support or disagree with this approach. 
This approach will only change if a sizeable portion of a community, or a valuable part of 
the area becomes subject to an increased hazard risk, and a large scale response is 
deemed necessary. This will be decided more by political means and community support 





















Aside from the risk transference in granting building consents as described above, the 
liability aspect of natural hazard management appears well understood from a pragmatic 
view. This was a well-discussed topic within the Alexandra response, concerning both the 
liability and moral obligation of the Crown and Contact Energy, and potential liability 
concerning the Council's role in the physical response. 
\Xlhere the main cause for the increased hazard can be identified, as with Contact Energy 
and the Crown in Alexandra, compensation claims can be directed to these entities. The 
local authorities in Alexandra had no claims directed at them, even though these were 
certainly investigated after each flood. The construction of structural defences, such as 
floodbanks, has not absolved the Crown of its responsibilities for the flooding in 
Alexandra, and if the def enc es prove ineffective, the Crown must fund another response. 
This is the result of negotiations between the Alexandra Community Board and the 
Crown . 
However, where no culpable party can be identified, the Crown will not step in without 
an obligation to do so. In an 'Act of God' situation, the communities affected will have 
to cope with this on their own. If the Crown were to respond to each event, this would 
remove incentives for local government or community response. This differs from 
Crown funding to relieve social suffering and disruption which is viewed as both a 
humanitarian and political measure. In this situation, there is no liability should the 
response carried out by local government fail, unless negligence can be proven in the 
particulars of the response. Such factors may include indefensible calculations, 
engineering faults, or failure to take known information into account. However, when 
unforeseeable natural hazard events occur and when due process is carried out 
responsibly and is defensible to legal challenge, there is no liability. 
6.4 Perception of the Increased Flood Hazard 
Respondents awareness of the hazard to the township clearly demonstrated an initial 
dichotomy between community and technical perceptions of the flood hazard that only 



















The issue of sedimentation was realised by the Crown long before a dam was considered, 
and early reports accepted that commissioning a dam would have an effect on flood 
levels at some point in the future. However, construction proceeded and the issue of an 
increased flood hazard to Alexandra was largely ignored. At this stage, Central 
Government departments were calculating the flood levels using a 'fascinating cascade of 
interpretation' of flood frequency statistics, which showed the risk generally decreasing 
until the early 1990s. Technical work conducted by the Ministry of Works on the 
connection between sediment deposition and flood risk was conducted during the late 
1970s, but this was not widely recognised among experts until the late 1980s. The 
District Council was aware of a flood risk during this period, and produced hazard maps 
showing the highest flood levels from 1993 onwards. 
The general community of Alexandra was unaware of this increased flood hazard pre-
1994, but when successive floods reached higher levels for the flow volume a perception 
of an increased risk developed in some sectors of the community. 
The two views came together with an investigation on sedimentation by the Otago 
Regional Council following the 1994 flooding, which provided scientific evidence of a 
relationship between the two. Recalculation of the flood risk and maximum probable 
flood levels was conducted by the Regional Council after each of the floods, and at 
present, due to the wealth of data provided by flooding in the 1990s, the flood risk is 
judged to be better understood than before (ORC, 2000) . 
6.5 The Physical Response in Alexandra 
The situation in Alexandra is unusual for an increased flood hazard, in that the sole cause 
was demonstratably the fault of a single development constructed under special 
legislation passed by Parliament. This allowed the development of a robust case for 
compensation and future security for the township, and resulted in a total financial 
package of over $20 million being paid. This has removed the financial constraints to the 














The section of the response addressing future hazard management (as opposed to 
compensation and redevelopment of the town) involved purchasing the most severely 
flood affected buildings, and the erection of structural flood defences on this land with 
the settlement funding. 
Analysed against the flood hazard management theory presented in Chapter Two, this 
response is a pragmatic combination of structural and non-structural approaches. The 
CSC report considered purchase of flood prone properties as the most effective single 
protection mechanism, as it was the quickest and most economic measure, and relieved 
the social problems caused by the flood hazard. This confirms the effectiveness of 
'vulnerability modification' measures, and suggests that with adequate funding and the 
perception of an increased flood hazard caused by a hazard event, both the financial 
constraints and social resistance can be overcome on a scale limited to the most affected 
areas. 
Only after this action was taken was the security of the rest of the town considered. 
However, given that the flood prone properties were owned now by the Crown, it was 
straightforward to place a measure of structural protection on this land to decrease the 
risk of flooding considerably. Thus the disrupted areas of the town were used to give the 
town an added element of security from flooding. This also demonstrates that 
redevelopment of areas is much easier and more effective following a natural disaster, 
and allows known concerns to be taken into account. 
The effectiveness of this predominantly non-structural action, given the short time 
required for implementation, was also an advantage whert compared with the extent of 
time required for major river modifications, with extensive water and land use consents 
being required. This action created a sense of security for the community so that the 
recovery from the effects of the flood could occur. As Alexandra has a static population 
level, it is unlikely that intensification of development will occur, establishing the 
























6.6 The Difficulties of Proactive Response 
The optimum time for local government to respond to a perceived increase in risk from 
a natural hazard in terms of avoiding, remedying or mitigating adverse effects is before a 
hazard event occurs. Yet for many reasons, it is extremely difficult, if at all possible, for 
this to be accomplished. The barriers to proactive responses by local government, such 
as relocation of at risk activities, or construction of structural defences, are described in 
Chapter Two, and can include: 
o social resistance to change; 
o lack of awareness of the hazard; 
o lack of resources to respond; 
o a focus on short term benefits. 
This study, through an analysis of the Alexandra situation and key informant interviews, 
has identified barriers to this response existing within the New Zealand hazard 
management framework. These are: 
o difficulty with identification of the hazard, and defensibility of responses; 
o problems with perceptions and understanding of the hazard; 
o the available resources for response; 
o differing levels of acceptable risk within a community. 
These are discussed in detail below . 
6.6.1 Hazard Identification 
Gaining the necessary information to identify an increase in a hazard risk, with enough 
precision to warrant a particular response as both necessary and justifiable, was seen as a 
major impediment to a proactive response. 
This problem has two main facets. The first is having sufficient data to realise that the 


























less that 150 years, a serious problem in predicting the return intervals of extreme events 
is encountered, as few of these have occurred within this timespan. Even though regional 
predictions for climate change effects can be made, these usually have inherent 
uncertainties that preclude accurate translation to specific site hazards. The second factor 
is the ability to use this information, once obtained, to justify a response that that may 
cause social disruption or require large amounts of funding. It would be extremely 
difficult to win a defensive action for a regulatory decision in the Environment Court 
under the current legislative regime without either national direction provided by central 
government, or explicit enabling legislation. These would allow councils to effectively 
manage increasing natural hazards without facing disruptive legal action provided they 
function within statutory bounds. 
6.6.2 Perception and Understanding of the Hazard 
Perception of the hazard, and, more importantly, full understanding of the statistical and 
probabilistic components of the risk pose a threat to the ability of communities and local 
authorities to respond. The actual meaning of a 1 % A.E.P. flood is not accurately 
reflected by the term '100 year flood', but this is not apparent without some study of the 
topic. Common perceptions gained from this include an understanding that once a major 
flood event occurs, another of the same magnitude will not occur within the return time, 
or that a major disaster with a high return time will not occur in the short term over 
which individuals or elected representatives plan. This lack of understanding is reinforced 
by the general nature of increasing flood hazards. Unlike the Alexandra situation, most 
natural hazards will increase gradually; a 100% increase in the probability of a 1 % A.E.P . 
flood will double the frequency, so that a flood of this level will have a return period of 
only 50 years, still beyond the ordinary planning timeframe. This means that even a 
doubling of the risk associated with a natural hazard does little to inspire a sense of 
urgency. The short term nature of memories of hazards events, migration of people, and 
changes in both the organisations responsible for managing natural hazards, and their 
























6.6.3 Available Resources 
Even if the previous problems are overcome, and the increased natural hazard is 
identified and properly perceived by both the community and decision makers, the 
possible response is limited by the resources available to a council. As the burden for 
natural hazard management falls upon local authorities, this cost must be met by the 
ratepayer base. For many of New Zealand's smaller townships, this can prove 
prohibitive; the cost of the Alexandra response is over $4700 per individual, a totally 
unaffordable amount in that community. There is also the issue of how this cost should 
be distributed across the community. Should those at greater risk be required to 
contribute more? As a community ultimately meets the cost, and must coexist with the 
consequences of the response, there must be a major community input into the decision-
making process, and broad community support for response. These factors raise many 
questions that must be addressed in situations of increasing risk from natural hazards; Is 
the community prepared to pay, and, if so, how much? Do they have the will to live and 
work with their decision and its consequences? The responses to these questions will 
differ in each situation as the nature and scale of the hazard, the nature of possible 
responses, and the composition of the community will be different. 
6.6.4 Differing Levels of Acceptable Community Risk 
How does a diverse community, composed of many different groups, decide on a 
suitable response that is both fair and equitable? And what right does a local authority 
have to restrict people's rights to live where they choose if they are prepared to accept 
the liability in doing so? The main local authority responsibility addressing this issue is 
the provision of accurate information and education to the community, so that 
determination of acceptable risk is based on a true and accurate interpretation of known 
facts, and not on misperception or ignorance of the hazard. 
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The main issues concerning local government response to an increasing flood hazard 
identified from the Alexandra situation have been discussed. 
The development of a gap between the Regional Council policy formation role, and the 
land control functions of the District Council for natural hazards management has the 
potential to cause a fragmented approach in the future. 
Section 36 of the Building Act, while providing some requirement for flood proofing of 
buildings, is not considered an effective method for preventing building in flood prone 
areas, and relies on the ability of District Councils to avoid liability by transferring risk 
acceptance to the developer. Conflict between Section 10 of the RMA and increasing 
flood hazards is avoided in Alexandra by the use of the same risk transference 
mechanism as above. This approach is necessitated by constraints oh Council resources, 
and the issue of public expense in protecting private land. 
Liability of the Council is not an issue unless it can be shown that it has acted in a 
negligent manner. The transference of risk removes any obligation for the Council to 
enact structural defences unless funding is provided by the property owners. 
A separation of the flood hazard perception between technical and community 
viewpoints resulted in Alexandra, due to the lack of investigation of the nature of the risk 
until flooding occurred. This prevented a true understanding of the hazard emerging 
earlier, and resulted in a lack of any sense of urgency for a proactive response. 
The physical response in Alexandra to the increased flood hazard focussed on the 
relocation of at-risk inhabitants by purchase of flood prone properties, and use of these 
to install structural defences to protect the rest of the town. This demonstrates that 
external funding and the occurrence of a hazard event can overcome the major 
constraints to vulnerability reduction. 
However, several impediments to a proactive response to an increased natural hazard 



















certainty that is defensible in court, a true understanding of the true nature of the hazard, 
the resources available to fund the response, and the potential for a wide range of 
acceptable risk within a community. 
Chapter Seven provides a synthesis of the body of this report, and presents conclusions 






















7 .1 Project Aims 
The goal of this project has been to investigate the adequacy of the processes provided 
by current local government legislation by which local authorities can respond to 
increasing flood hazards in established urban areas. This has been identified as a potential 
problem in reversing the trend of increasing flood damage to New Zealand towns. The 





To determine whether there is conflict between existing use rights under 
Section 10 of the RMA 199, and planning for increasing natural hazards . 
To assess the current natural hazards management framework in relation to 
responding proactively to an increased natural hazard . 
To develop recommendations by which local authorities can respond to 
increased flood hazards . 
Research Summary 
7.2.1 Flood Hazard Management 
The preceding chapters have defined the nature of flooding as a natural hazard, and 
reviewed the current paradigms of managing the risk of flooding. The three types of 























been investigated with respect to effectively managing increasing natural hazard risk. This 
has shown that each of these methodologies has barriers that preclude their effectiveness. 
Modification of the flood, especially with large scale structural works, while effective in 
the short to medium term, is ultimately self defeating. Increasing development producing 
an increased demand for protection, which in turn encourages more intensive 
development, creates the 'catastrophe cycle' where the potential damage, should the 
defences fail, is catastrophic. Decreasing the vulnerability to flooding is seen as the most 
effective measure in reducing damage, but aside from individuals implementing flood 
proofing of structures and possessions, there are few options available. Large scale 
relocation or modification of established infrastructure in hazard prone areas is usually 
too expensive and socially disruptive for most communities to consider. Insurance 
schemes can be effective in re-establishing affected communities, but only if premiums 
effectively match the risk posed by the hazard. While they can be used to encourage 
vulnerability reduction, too often these, and disaster relief schemes, act as a subsidy to 
those occupying hazard prone sites. 
7.2.2 The New Zealand Context 
The historical development of flood management in New Zealand has been described. 
This demonstrates the genesis of the problem due to the opening up of flood prone land 
to economically productive uses through structural works, and the reluctance of local 
authorities to adopt land use controls, which has resulted in many of New Zealand's 
urban areas now being at risk from increased flood hazards. 
A review of the current New Zealand hazard management legislative regime, consisting 
of the Resource Management Act 1991 and the Building Act 1991 is presented. The 
RMA provisions are designed to allow the benefits and costs of permitting activities in 
flood prone areas to be balanced while encouraging the avoidance of unacceptable risks, 
while the BA is considered more prescriptive and regulatory. 
Responsibility for managing natural hazards lies with both Regional and District 
Councils, and overlaps their respective spheres. Initial confusion over the nature of this 
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which allows the division of responsibilities to be stated in the Regional Policy Statement. 
Section 106 of the RMA, and Section 36 of the BA provide legislative tools to control 
the granting of resoui:ce and building consents in hazard prone areas. The BA sets forth a 
process whereby land subject to a specified natural hazard can be granted a building 
consent, provided the District Land Registrar is notified and an entry made on the Land 
Information Memorandum concerning the hazard. Regional and District Plans can also 
be used to manage natural hazard risk. The provision of information and education 
concerning the risks of natural hazards, regulatory methods, the establishment of 
structural event modification works (subject to Section 32 requirements), and the 
imposition of conditions on subdivision consents are all methods that can be used by 
local authorities. 
However, where existing use rights granted under Section 10 of the RMA stand, there 
appear to be no mechanisms for local authorities to manage the risk to these created by 
increasing natural hazards. With no statutory mechanisms or case law to guide councils, 
there exists a potential difficulty in managing this issue within the limits of available 
resources. This appears to sit uneasily with the potential for council liability when these 
activities come into conflict with the increasing frequency and magnitude of natural 
hazards, and councils are caught between responding proactively and facing problems 
justifying the necessity of the reaction, and not responding and being subject to legal 
action should a hazard event occur. 
7 .3 Issue Identification and Analysis 
The applicability of the results drawn from the literature were investigated through a case 
study of the response by local government in the township of Alexandra, which suffered 
three major flood events in five years during the 1990s. Through an analysis of the 
response following the 1999 flood, based on key informant interviews with a range of 
those involved in this response from a variety of organisations, including the Otago 
Regional Council, the Central Otago District Council, and the Alexandra Community 
Board, issues related to the research problem and objectives were identified. These were 





























From this emerged the conclusions related to the research objectives. These are 
summarised below. 
7.3.1 The relationship between local government levels 
A gap between the environmental management functions of Regional Councils, which 
involve the development of policy as opposed to enforceable technical regulations, and 
the District Council land control functions was identified. This may result in a 
fragmented approach to natural hazard management, as a lack of technical support for 
District Council regulations may hinder the effectiveness of land control measures . 
7.3.2 The effectiveness of the relevant legislation 
Section 36 of the Building Act is not considered effective in allowing District Councils to 
restrict building in flood prone areas, but allows the risk to be transferred from a council 
to a property owner. This mechanism is used to transfer risk in the case of existing 
developments, thereby preventing direct conflict with Section 10 of the Resource 
Management Act. However, this may be considered as incompatible with the 
requirements of the Resource Management Act for the sustainable management of 
natural hazards. Strengthening of the legislative requirements for new developments, and 
the provision of alternatives to local government risk transference are required. 
7.3.3 Liability issues 
Liability of local government is not an issue, unless it can be shown that a council has 
acted in a negligent manner in discharging its duties. This protects local authorities from 
unpredictable events, yet ensures that their duties are carried out responsibly. Where an 
external factor can clearly be identified as having caused the increased natural hazard, 
legal action can be initiated against this entity. However, unless there is provable legal 
liability, it would be far more effective for affected communities and local authorities to 



























7.3.4 Perception of increasing hazards 
A dichotomy bemreen technical and community views of the increased hazard in the 
Alexandra case resulted in misunderstanding of the risk, and a lack of urgency for a 
proactive, or even post-flood response. Increasing natural hazards must be detected at an 
early stage to allow for proper investigation, and a community must be informed of the 
true nature of the risk. This must be accompanied by information and education 
concerning the causes and effects of the hazard. 
7.3.5 An assessment of the Alexandra response 
The response of the Alexandra Community Board and the Central Otago District 
Council to the increased flood hazard only occurred after the third major flood in five 
years. This lack of initial action resulted from a fragmented approach in claiming 
compensation by the community, and arguments over liability bet\veen the Crown, 
Contact Energy, and the Central Otago District Council. It was only after the 1999 flood 
that a united front was formed, resulting in the appointment of the independent Clutha 
Solutions Co-ordinator, and the community driven Future Directions Strategy. The 
recommendations of these resulted in a payment of compensation from the Crown and 
Contact Energy. 
The future flood hazard management component of the response consisted of purchase 
of the flood prone properties, and the erection of structural defences on this land. This is 
a pragmatic solution, combining structural and non-structural techniques in order to 
alleviate the social effects of flooding, and to provide security for the rest of the 
community against future flooding. 
7.3.6 The constraints to proactive response to increased natural hazards 
There are several major constraints to reacting to an increased natural hazard before a 
hazard event occurs. These are the difficulties in identifying the increased risk to an 




















hazard, the resources available for the response, and the potential for a wide range of 
acceptable risk within a community. 
Of these, only the difficulty of defending interpretations of the increased hazard, and the 
lack of resources, are directly attributable to the legislative framework within which local 
government natural hazards planning operates. It is difficult for complex scientific 
information to be accepted in the Environment Court, where the true nature of the 
information is not easily understood by the layperson, and frequently conflicts with social 
and economic factors, which are accorded the same weight (L. Slooten,pers. comm.). The 
lack of resources is due to the devolution of many responsibilities to local government 
during reforms in the late 1980s, and a lack of recognition of the significance of the 
research problem by the government. As many communities are unable to fund proactive 
flood management actions, the damage and disruption caused by increased flooding will 
continue until an external funding source becomes available. 
Understanding by the community and decision makers of the real risk represented by the 
hazard can be encouraged by local authorities by provision of information, but ultimately 
this depends on its acceptance by the individual. The wide range of acceptable risks 
within a single community is a factor that must be dealt with for each different 
community, but the basic responsibility of local authorities is to define a maximum risk 
that community members may accept. Ideally, regional councils should be able to define 
a maximum risk line on the ground, and district councils should be able to implement 
regulations that effectively prohibit certain activities or building uses below this line. 
7.4 Summary 
This study has analysed the Alexandra response to an increased flood hazard in order to 
address the research objectives. It has determined that there was no conflict between 
existing use rights of the R1v1A and natural hazard management, and has assessed the 
impediments to responding proactively to an increased natural hazard under the current 
























The recommendations of this study are presented in Chapter Eight. These will address 
research objective (iii) by assessing changes required to the legislative framework, the 
operation of local authorities, and the development of community responses in areas of 

























In order to manage the flood hazard in New Zealand in a sustainable manner, and 
reverse the worldwide trend of increasing damage caused by natural hazards, changes 
must be made at both central and local government levels. 
At central government level, national direction is needed for local government response 
to increasing natural hazards. Specific actions include: 
0 
0 
While national direction of issues of concern can be provided for by National 
Policy Statements, the fact that none have been produced in the first ten years of 
the operation of the RMA demonstrates the difficulty of doing so. The 
preparation of Ministry for the Environment publications for both local 
authorities and communities, setting forth national direction on responses while 
allowing scope for local direction to be incorporated would be a valuable move. 
These publications may be in the form of guidelines, discussion papers, 
information papers, reports, and information sheets. 
Amendment to legislation enabling local authorities greater or more explicit 
powers to respond to increased hazards, by setting out circumstances where this 
may occur, would increase the legal defensibility of their actions. Tightening the 
Building Act requirements so that local authorities can implement local 
restrictions of certain activities in certain circumstances would also be effective. 
o Investigate the feasibility of establishing a mechanism for funding, or granting of 






















should be directed mainly at vulnerability reduction, in order to reduce potential 
damage and social disruption resulting from increased flooding with a much 
smaller initial outlay. This would be especially effective in smaller or less affluent 
communities that are incapable of responding adequately without external 
funding sources. 
o The development of legislation determining responsibility and liability for the 
environmental effects of government constructed large dams that have been 
privatised. 
Action is required at the level of local government in order to implement national policy 
in a manner that encourages sustainability and works towards reversing the trend of 
increasing natural hazard damage. 
0 
0 
The establishment of a formal mechanism to prevent a gap opening between 
regional and district councils with respect to natural hazards. One method of this 
consists of the development of joint hazard management plans, which combine 
technical information with land use controls. By containing an explanation of the 
responses and risks these could be used to encourage community perception and 
understanding of the hazard risk. The proposed Local Government Amendment 
Act 2001 makes allowance for consultation between the different levels of local 
government that is not related to specific developments. This process could be 
used to ensure that regional and district plans are complementary with respect to 
Section 10 of the RMA, with district plan rules supported by regional council 
control over land as per Section 20(2) of the RMA, by means of exercising the 
functions of Section 30(1)(c)(iv). 
A tightening of rules and regulations to enforce the restriction of the granting of 
resource and building consents to at-risk developments. The current 'risk 
transference' mechanism is interpreted as a failure of existing mechanisms to 




















As the effects of increased flood hazards are likely to be faced only by specific 
communities in a district, and not over an entire district at any one time, there is a 
necessity for a community driven response to occur. In order for this to be successful in 
effectively addressing a hazard, several requirements have been identified from the case 
study. These are the will to respond, a community driven plan of action, and the 
resources to implement such a plan. 
o The Will to Respond 
A reason for a community to implement changes that may cause disruption or involve 
large expenditures must exist. Unfortunately for a proactive response, the most effective 
means of providing this is a series of repeated hazard events. In Alexandra, three floods 
were required for this to occur. Other means of providing a sense of urgency should 
occur, such as regional council perception of increased hazards through monitoring and 
technical investigation, or a realisation of the probable consequences of changes in the 
environment. 
o . A Community Supported Plan of Action 
Once the will to respond has developed, a viable, practicable response must be 
developed. This must obtain broad community support, which may be problematic in 
fragmented communities, or in areas where there is some tension between community 
and council. In areas where this occurs, or where the hazard crosses district or regional 
boundaries and other councils are involved, an independent position such as that of the 
Clutha Solutions Coordinator may be contracted to produce an independent, logical 
report within a limited timeframe; one that provides potential solutions that are 
acceptable to all parties. Where the solution does not involve this much complexity, a 
community driven plan such as the Future Directions Strategy would be a more effective 
use of resources. Such reports, though open to political interference, would provide plans 
of action in response to increased hazard risk. Depending on the scale and nature of a 
problem, this might be conducted by the relevant local authority, or an independent 
specialist. Both of these plans require community involvement and consultation 




















recommendations, and to develop an appropriate balance between the accepted risk and 
the cost to the community. 
o Resources for Implementation 
As with most actions taken by local authorities, the cost of implementation is a major 
impediment to proactive response. In Alexandra, funding was available as compensation 
for the creation of the increased flood hazard, but in other situations the cost of the 
response must be supported by the community. 
This situation has the potential to encourage vulnerability reduction as a response -
potentially more effective in preventing damage reduction than structural defences and 
generating low initial expenses. By discouraging the structural alternative, a community 
must gain an understanding of the hazard, and develop low cost, effective responses. 
Relocation of essential services, catchment modification (e.g. tree planting), or 
community understanding of how to prepare for, or act in, emergencies are all effective 
actions. By accepting, rather than attempting to avoid, the risk of flooding the 
catastrophe potential cycle is avoided, and sustainable adjustments to the hazard must be 
considered. 
Summary of Recommendations 
• Ministry for the Environment to prepare publications for local authorities and 
communities, setting forth national direction on responses . 
• Legislation amendment enabling local authorities to respond to increased 
hazards, increasing the legal defensibility of actions, including tightening Building 
Act requirements to allow for local restrictions. 
• Investigate the feasibility of establishing a funding mechanism to enable 














• Development of legislation determining responsibility and liability for the effects 
of privatised government constructed large dams. 
• Development of joint hazard management plans between regional and district 
councils, combining technical information with land use controls, to encourage 
community perception and understanding of the risk. 
• Tightening rules and regulations to enforce the restriction of the granting of 
resource and building consents to at-risk developments. 
• When preparing a community based response to an increased flood hazard, 
conduct a strategy that addresses the three main requirements; the will to 
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Interview Issues and Questions 
Issues to be discussed: 
How can councils in NZ respond to increased hazards in a sustainable way? 
Does the current resource management regime provide support and tools? 
Case study of Alexandra response to increased flood hazard. 
Understanding of local government responsibilities 
Perception of the increased hazard 
Response to the IFH 
General natural hazard management 
Liability issues 
Main Topics 
Institutional roles and responsibilities 
_Organisations understanding of its own roles and responsibilities 
Organisations understanding of others roles and responsibilities 
Have either of these understandings changed as the extent of Alexandra's new flood hazard was 
understood? 
Response to the increased hazard 
What was (your organisations) role in planning the response to the hazard? 
What options were considered? 
How was the final course of action decided on? 
What problems can you see with the current response? 
Do you feel that the tools available to (your organisation) were sufficient to deal with 

























Perception of the hazard 
When was the increased flood hazard perceived? 
At what stage did the ( organisation) accept that a response had to be made? 
Was this response driv~n by expert or community pressure? 
General hazard management 
Do you see increasing natural hazards as an important issue in the future? 
What do you think this is driven by? 
Are the current controls on new development in flood-prone areas effective enough? 
Will there be a conflict between existing development and natural hazards? 
Is the current hazard management regime in NZ sufficient to deal with this problem? 
If not, what changes could be made? 
Liability Issues 
What do organisations understand about liability issues and culpability? 
Questions 
Regional Council 
What does the RC see as its role in natural hazard planning in Otago? 
What about the role of District Councils? 
What does the RC understand as its duties in respect to the increased flood hazard in 
Alexandra? 
-when the increased risk was perceived 
-long-term actions 
How about the duties of the CODC in Alexandra? 
-when the increased risk was perceived 
-long-term actions 
Do you think that the flooding in Alexandra has caused a change in the role of, or 












What was the RCs role in planning the response to the hazard? 
What options were considered by the RC? 
How did this fit in with the CODCs response? 
How did you decide on the present response? What were the main factors? 
Can you see any limitations or potential problems with the current response? 
Do you think that the tools and mechanisms available to RCs were sufficient to deal 
with the Alexandra problem? 
What about for DCs? 
Do you think that the Clutha Solutions Coordinator position was necessary or 
effective? 
Do you see natural hazards as an increasingly important issue in the future? 
What do you think this is driven by? 
Are the current controls on new development in flood-prone areas effective enough 
in controlling natural hazards? 
Can you see a conflict betv.reen existing development and natural hazards in the 
future? 
Is the current hazard management regime in NZ sufficient to deal with this problem? 
If not, what changes could be made? 
At what stage was it realised that the flood hazard had increased? 
At what stage did the RC realise that a response had to be made? 
Was this response driven by expert or community pressure? 
Are you aware of any liability should a structural work fail, causing flooding damage? 
Are there any other liability issues regarding natural hazards that concern the RC? 
District Council 
What does the DC see as its role in natural hazard planning? 















What does the DC understand as its duties in respect to the increased flood hazard in 
Alexandra? 
-when the increased risk was perceived 
-long-term actions 
How about the duties of the RC in Alexandra? 
-when the increased risk was perceived 
-long-term actions 
Do you think that the flooding in Alexandra has caused a change in the role of, or 
the understanding of the role of any of these? 
What was the DCs role in planning the response to the hazard? 
Have any land use planning regulations changed as a result of the IFH? 
What options were considered by the DC? 
How did you decide on the present response? What were the main factors? 
How did this fit in with the RCs response? 
Can you see any limitations or potential problems with the current response? 
Do you think that the tools and mechanisms available to DCs were sufficient to deal 
with the Alexandra problem? 
What about for RCs? 
Do you think that the Clutha Solutions Coordinator position was necessary or 
effective? 
Do you see natural hazards as an increasingly important issue in the future? 
What do you think this is driven by? 
Are the current controls on new development in flood-prone areas effective enough 
in controlling natural hazards? 
Can you see a conflict between existing development and natural hazards in the 
future? 
Is the current hazard management regime in NZ sufficient to deal with this problem? 
If not, what changes could be made? 
At what stage was it realised that the flood hazard had increased? 
At what stage did the DC realise that a response had to be made? 























Are you aware of the liability should a structural work fail, causing flooding damage, 
or flood damage occur in an area approved for building? 
Are there any other liability issues regarding natural hazards that concern the DC? 
Community Board 
Is the increased flood hazard in Alexandra something that should have been dealt 
with at local government level? 
Why did the community board end up negotiating with Central Government? 
Is this something that you think the Regional or District Council should have done? 
What do you understand as the role of the RC in this situation? 
Do you think that they fulfilled their role effectively? 
What about the DCs role? 
Do you think that they fulfilled this role effectively? 
With three '100-year' floods, when do you think action should have been taken? 
How effective or necessary do you think the Clutha Solutions Coordinator position 
was? 
How acceptable to the community would 'managed retreat' or relocation of 
Alexandra be? 
What level of risk would l;>e acceptable to the community? Should individuals be able 
to choose the flood risk they take? 
Do you think that Alexandra will continue to be at risk from flooding? 
Will local government be prepared for the next flood? 
Where do you think liability should fall, if a structural work fails, or flood damage 
occur in an area approved for building? 
Are there any other liability issues regarding natural hazards that concern the ACB? 
What is the role of Central Government in: responding to natural hazard events? 
planning proactively for natural hazards? 
Given that the damage potential of natural disasters is increasing, who bears the main 
responsibility for the situations given above? 
